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Who's afraid of North Korea?

Why is the Bush administration so afraid of a peace agreement with North Korea? Last Wednesday's meeting between President Bush and South Korean President Kim Dae Jung showed a significant departure from Clinton's policy. Bush officials have been talking tough about North Korea, saying it remains a major threat to the US and that a peace agreement will have to wait. Although North Korea remains an isolated and highly secretive country, it needs help from the West and for the first time in 50 years, and there is a chance to lower the tension between North and South. But Pyongyang could easily slip back into isolation if Bush continues to put off an agreement.

The end of the Korean War left almost all questions unanswered. No peace treaty was ever signed, and a tenuous armistice has been in place until today. Large armies faced off at the border and proceeded to dig in, eyeing each other suspiciously across no-man's land. Today, the area is one of the most militarized on earth.

North Korea is not a nice place to live. For years, it was the prototypical "rogue state": developing and exporting nuclear weapons technology, supposedly sponsoring terrorism, making threatening gestures toward Japan and South Korea and maintaining a million-man army on the border. President Kim Jong Il and his predecessors were extremely oppressive. They controlled the media and the economy, and built up a formidable military.

In 1994, intelligence revealed North Korea was taking fissile material out of its nuclear reactors. This gave the West a huge fright and looked like it might set off a major international crisis. Through 11th-hour negotiations with Jimmy Carter (the best ex-president we have ever had), the Agreed Framework was reached _ an agreement where the North would give up its heavy-water reactors in exchange for fuel and light-water reactors from the US (light-water reactors are harder to get weapon-grade plutonium from). To date, this is the only formal agreement we have made with North Korea.

The Agreed Framework set off a series of events culminating in the historic meeting between Kim Jong Il and Kim Dae Jung last June. Families that have been divided for 50 years were allowed to speak to each other. Late last year, Madeline Albright visited Pyongyang, and Clinton came tantalizingly close to going himself. All signs pointed to a thawing of relations.

But things have changed. Last week, Bush said he had no indication that North Korea was keeping its promises. This is true, but there is no evidence to the contrary, either. If Bush continues to delay an agreement, all the progress of the past six years could be lost, and for no good reason. It is understandable that Bush wants to take a hard-line with North Korea _ Kim Jong Il is a man who understands only force. But taking such a policy too far could ruin the rapprochement that has been built. In South Korea, Kim Dae Jung's term ends in 2002. His "sunshine" policy has been integral in making peace, and losing him could be a serious blow to further progress.

Clinton's policy was working _ in 1999 Pyongyang agreed to stop testing long-range missiles and was meeting more and more with US and South Korean officials. North Korea could easily slip back into isolation if engagement is not pursued. If Bush wants to talk tough for a while, that is fine, provided he eventually continues to seek a peace agreement. But too much tough-talk could scuttle the entire thing _ it is not worth it.

The trick is to get North Korea on our side without making Kim Jong Il feel his regime is being threatened. This is tough since Pyongyang has a Stalinist-era totalitarian government _ we do not see eye-to-eye on almost every issue and see the world in very different ways. Though it is difficult to do business with a nation that occasionally lobs missiles over Japan and that allows famine to ravish its population, engagement is the way to go. It is all too easy for North Korea to go back into isolation for another few years, where we would have little leverage over their nuclear program and would be unable to lend urgently needed aid.

North Korea has repeatedly expressed impatience with the pace at which things are moving. One North Korean official bluntly stated, "We promised not to test-fire long-range missiles during the duration of talks on the missile issue, but we cannot do so indefinitely." This should be seen as a sign of their dire need for aid and investment _ they are trying to push ahead as quickly as possible. The US should not allow itself to be cowed by Pyongyang's rhetoric _ North Korea needs us, not vice versa _ but by the same token, there is every reason to move ahead.

There are numerous benefits to a peace agreement. First, a half-century-old conflict can be brought to an end. Second, North Korea can get desperately needed aid and investment. Third, proliferation of nuclear weapons can be better controlled. Fourth, the border can be demilitarized, meaning many of the 37,000 US troops can come home. Lastly, the need for an anti-missile defense system will be lowered, though this may not be what the Bush administration wants.

At times it seems as if our government needs to manufacture enemies, even when no major threats exist. Part of Bush's coldness to North Korea could be his desire to build an anti-missile defense system. Without a serious enemy, what is the use of a missile defense system? North Korea, after all, was one of the biggest arguments for building such a system in the first place. Selfish interests and a need to appear tough must not get in the way of a peace agreement. It is time this half-century-old conflict was brought to an end and we have a chance now that might not be around in a couple months _ best not to blow it.