Pursuing the national interest?

Remember when the Republican Party could not get enough of bludgeoning then-President Clinton for his foreign policy record?

For those of you who do not, it sounded something like this _ "Clinton may not leave a legacy in foreign affairs, but what he will leave is a void: no clear priorities, no consistency or thoroughness in the implementation of strategies, and no true commitment to building a domestic consensus in support of internationalism." That is from Richard Haass, who now works in the Bush administration, from his article 'The Squandered Presidency' which was printed in the May/June 2000 edition of Foreign Affairs.

In the Jan/Feb. edition of the same magazine, in an article entitled "Pursuing the National Interests," Condolezza Rice, also now working for Bush, advocated "a foreign policy that set the more important apart from the trivial," in contrast with Clinton, who "took every issue on its own terms, crisis by crisis, day by day."

Other Republican commentators also criticized the Clinton administration for a lack of long-term strategic thinking, indecision, and acting without popular approval. Bush also made it known during his campaign that he would conduct a more "humble" foreign policy, less idealistic and missionary than the Clinton administration.

These claims certainly had merit. Clinton made many notable mistakes in foreign policy during his presidency, particularly in the first term. Chalk it up to the novel nature of post-Cold War diplomacy or to being the first Democrat in office since Jimmy Carter (who had his fair share of foreign policy disasters), but there were definitely problems. You would think the Bush administration might have learned from those failures, having watched the whole thing, and then built a whole campaign platform upon criticizing Clinton's policy.

Fast-forward to 2002. The Bush administration, or at least Bush, has made attack on Iraq one of its major priorities, and has already written off negotiations between the UN and Iraq for the return of weapons inspectors. Bush and others have raised some valid concerns over the security threat that Iraq represents for the United States and its allies. Fine. I agree. But pursuing this policy unilaterally and without entering negotiations first is nothing if not short-sighted. Moreover, it is being justified by the same missionary moralism that characterized the Clinton administration.

What strategic vision could attack Iraq possibly fit under? The Bush administration might want to file it under the War on Terrorism, but a link between Saddam and Sept. 11 has yet to be shown. Sure, Saddam gives some cash to families' of Palestinian suicide bombers, but that is not the real problem.

Do you think Saddam Hussein's $10,000 dollars is the only thing driving Palestinian terrorism? Me neither. What's more, a lot of the most virulent anti-American sentiment is found in American allies, like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Most of the terrorists involved in 9/11 were Saudi, not Iraqi. In other words, as an anti-terrorism measure, an attack on Iraq is not all that effective.

Non-proliferation would be another long-term objective. It is absolutely in US interest to keep nuclear, biological and chemical weapons out of the hands of terrorists and rogue states. But after careful consideration, an attack on Iraq would not be the best means to this end.

The success of non-proliferation rests on some form of monitoring, so that weapons programs can be controlled, or at least known. But since Iraq's offer to allow inspectors to enter its borders, the Bush administration has repeatedly derided the ineffectiveness of the weapons inspection program in its entirety.

Bush's case for military action in Iraq rests on the ambiguity of the weapons inspection process. Namely, did Iraq have weapons programs that were not detected by inspectors prior to 1998? Could inspectors uncover and disarm Iraqi weapons programs if allowed to reenter?

Everyone should acknowledge that Saddam Hussein will do everything in his power to hide his projects. But that is no reason to undermine the whole idea of inspection _ it is all the more reason to go into negotiations with Iraq immediately in order to gain unfettered access for inspectors.

Furthermore, states need to be able to enter negotiations about weapons programs without being called liars and having their leader repeatedly threatened. The negotiations should be about bringing Iraq back into the international community, not about keeping it out.

Other long-term plans would also be damaged by unilateral action. An attack would have significant negative effects on our relationships with other Arab states and Europe, especially if the US continues to dismiss negotiations on weapons inspectors. Our relationship with Europe has been the foundation of our foreign policy ever since World War II and will continue to be a centerpiece of any decent long-term strategy. As the European Union integrates, it will be in the American interest to integrate the EU with the US as well, building a partnership instead of a rivalry.

Jeopardizing that relationship by attacking Iraq, potentially without the consent of the UN or NATO, would be risky.

Acting without UN approval would also further de-legitimize the UN. In his speech at the UN several days before the Iraqi proposal, Bush told the UN that if it did not act to enforce Security Council resolutions, it was in danger of becoming a "debating society."

If the US acts unilaterally without the backing of an SC resolution or even in direct defiance of one, this would certainly put the weakness of the UN on full display. If Bush ever really cared about strengthening the UN, going into negotiations with Iraq and building a consensus on its true intentions would be the best way.

Bush has created further problems by the way he has framed the debate on Iraq. By using legal and moral arguments to gain support for an attack, he has made the US position more vulnerable.

In his speech to the UN and in various other interviews and documents, Bush cited Iraq's violation of UN Security Resolutions (mostly concerning weapons inspectors) as a legal basis for a war on Iraq. This provided the opportunity for Iraq to undercut Bush by making a proposal for the return of inspectors, however phony.

Most people don't bother themselves with getting bogged down in the technical details of negotiations of this sort _ all they see is that Bush asked for something, Iraq gave it, and Bush is still not happy.

Bush has also tried to gather public support for action by recalling Saddam's past sins _ the gassing of his own people, the invasion of his neighbors, etc. These statements give opportunity to nay-sayers to question US credibility on several grounds.

First, the US supports other regimes, in the Middle East and elsewhere, whose human rights records are comparable. Second, many of the atrocities committed by Saddam in the past were committed with full US knowledge and acceptance. Both the war on Iran and the gassing of Kurds fall under this category.

Lastly, this type of rhetoric is exactly the same kind of universalistic idealism that Bush criticized, and rightly so, in Clinton. Bush has made a good case for being wary of Iraq as a threat to US security and regional stability in the Middle East. There is no reason to dilute and cloud that argument with moral statements.

It may very well be that the Iraqi proposal is just a bluff. But in order to maintain allies, international institutions, and non-proliferation, it needs to be explored. Writing negotiations off before they have even started could be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Everyone needs to remember that the best-case scenario is that Iraq does let weapons inspectors back in with unfettered access, disarming Iraq and bringing it back into the community of nations, even if Saddam Hussein is still their leader.

Bush could still claim victory _ it was in part his speech before the UN that brought about the Iraqi proposal. If, after negotiation, a deal proves impossible, then military action would be appropriate, and I think the UN and our allies would agree.

I agree with Condolezza Rice that it is imperative for the US to maintain a firm view of its own interest, and not be distracted from its strategic vision by short-term problems. And I agree with Haass that we need clear priorities, and a commitment to building a domestic consensus towards internationalism. But where are these ideas in the Bush administration.