Casus belli: a justification for war?

Why exactly is the United States about to wage war on Iraq? Is it because, as President Bush argues, Saddam Hussein is an evil-doer who tyrannizes his own people and threatens others? Is it because his regime seeks to acquire weapons of mass destruction that could be used _ directly or via proxies _ against this country and its allies? Or is it because Iraq is a state sponsor of "terrorism of global reach," the stated target of the Bush administration's current global campaign?

None of these justifications is to be dismissed lightly. Saddam Hussein's is indeed a regime of extraordinary malignancy _ one that has mounted genocidal attacks on segments of Iraq's population, dropped chemical agents on Kurdish civilians causing death and gruesome deformities that continue to afflict babies born even today, tortures thousands of political prisoners, and sends dissidents abroad videotapes of their female relatives being raped by security personnel.

It is also a regime that has sought to develop biological and nuclear as well as chemical weapons in the past, and will certainly continue to do so if given the chance. And it has been a major sponsor of international terrorism, including the Abu Nidal organization responsible for killing of hundreds of people, most of them citizens of neighboring Arab countries.

Eliminating such a regime is evidently a worthwhile objective. But does it warrant a unilateral American invasion that may lead to high casualties, inflame the Arab world, and strain relations with other powers such as Russia, China, France, and Germany? After all, the critics point out, aren't there many vile regimes in the world? Doesn't the North Korean government, for example, brutalize its people, develop weapons of mass destruction, and sponsor international terrorism? Why focus on Iraq?

Besides, they add, it is very unlikely that Saddam Hussein would target the United States under normal circumstances, because he would know that retaliation would be inevitable. Wouldn't setting out to destroy him serve only to remove any constraints on his use of whatever means are at his disposal? These are valid questions, and arguments focusing on human rights, counter-terrorism, and disarmament do not suffice to dispel them. If the United States is to shoulder the costs and dangers outlined above, it has to be for a more compelling reason. Such a reason exists.

Saddam Hussein's regime is the culmination of a current in Arab political culture that has been gathering force almost since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire eight decades ago. Its growth medium is the humiliation Arabs have endured at the hands of Western powers and Israel. Domestically, it is manifested in a chauvinistic authoritarianism that subordinates every other consideration _ individual liberties, minority rights, socio-economic development _ to its ultra-nationalist cause. Externally, it evinces an aggressive militarism that aims at uniting the entire Arab world by force. It is, in short, an Arab version of fascism.

Like its counterparts in Germany and Japan earlier this century, Arab fascism has the potential to mobilize great energies and achieve impressive results, at least in industrial and military terms. Like them, it is irresistibly drawn to war. If the Iraqi regime is left in place, it will find ways of acquiring a serious arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, and then it will feel confident enough to resume its aggressive behavior toward its neighbors.

And at some point, whether because of a misstep analogous to Pearl Harbor or Hitler's invasion of Russia, or whether because a more incremental military expansion finally proves intolerable to the United States and other actors, an all-out conflict utilizing all the weapons at hand will become inevitable. Although it will end as World War II ended, with a defeat of fascism, millions of people _ mostly Arabs but also Americans and others _ will have died in the meantime.

If a war is to be fought, then, it must be in order to preempt this scenario. But neutralizing fascism in the Arab world _ healing a political culture that celebrates the likes of Saddam Hussein and the Sept 11 terrorists _ will require more than an overthrow of the Iraqi regime. It will require constructing something better in its place. If another dictator emerges to replace the current one, very little will have been gained. The United States must foster and defend a more liberal and inclusive new order that can serve as a credible model for the rest of the Arab world. The Kurds will have to be given real autonomy and protected from their internal and external enemies. The new leadership in Baghdad will have to be propped up not only with military and economic support, but also with a genuine effort to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict _ that incubator of regional radicalism _ in a manner that gives as much dignity and security to Palestinians as to Israelis.

In short, the United States will need to display a level of commitment and skill comparable to what it did in Germany and Japan after World War II. If it succeeds, and in the process convinces the Arabs that there can be a convergence between its interests and theirs, then the entire region can be transformed from the crucible of war, repression, and terror that it is today. If it fails _ either through a failure of nerve or because the needs and aspirations of the Iraqi and Arab peoples are not taken into account _ then a true nightmare may await us all.



Malik Mufti is an associate professor in the Political Science Department.