The illusions in the Intifada

Entering the third year of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is important to look back and evaluate the implications that such an uprising has on the makings of the Middle East. Seeing the headlines describing both Israeli sieges of Palestinian buildings and of countless Palestinian suicide bombings ravaging Israeli towns, it is easy to loose sight of the long-term consequences of this conflict, even if the current cycle of violence were to end tomorrow.

This being said, we must be prudent in examining the consequences by first establishing the reasoning for the continued conflict. Why do Palestinians persist on waging such uprising? More importantly, why do they persist with such unwavering support, even in the face of curfews, a totally crippled economy, and mounting death tolls? A recent poll conducted during the anniversary of the war indicates that 80.6 percent of the Palestinians support the continuation of the Intifada while 70 percent support a continuation of the military struggle.

Policymakers and academics believe that humans act in their own best interests, logically reasoning that if it weren't for the expectation of a positive future pay off, individuals would not engage in such calculated destruction. This is exemplified by the Palestinian belief, shared by 83.9 percent of the population, that either the Intifada, or the Intifada allied with negotiations, is the best way to achieve the national goal of ending the occupation.

The rationale behind their reasoning is quite clear: although Palestinians are suffering, the suicide bombings are also inflicting pain and fear into Israeli society. Further, although their tactics have undermined any sense of security, crippled their economy, and damaged their relations with some countries around world, their rationale determines that this is what will bring Israelis to the negotiating table with larger concessions than those that were being discussed before the Intifada broke out.

This rationale has backfired, however. Instead of Israelis backing down on their demands, the sense of insecurity brought more distrust, polarized the political debate and allowed for military reprisals unthought-of only a couple of years ago.

Two years ago, with all of the problems and intractable negotiations, Palestinians still had a government and a temporary rule over certain areas in the territories. Today, they have neither.

In 1999, negotiations were revolving around the issue of Jerusalem, which Israel had always considered its undividable capital. Today, negotiations are revolving simply around ending the siege of the Muqata, deep into former Palestinian-controlled Ramallah.

More importantly, even, are not the territorial delimitations, but rather the deeper mingling of both societies. Security services once cooperated, and educational institutions (albeit at a limited extent), shared knowledge.

For over a generation, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians entered Israel and worked there. Today, very few Palestinians have work permits allowing them to work inside Israel.

Instead of trying to bring Palestinian workers back, Israeli society has coped with the lack of such labor force with a large influx of foreign workers. Today, over 300,000 foreign workers work inside Israel, many working in the jobs previously held by Palestinians.

In essence, Israelis are making their best effort to insulate themselves from any dependence on Palestinians. The new fence being built is just the physical evidence of this unfortunate phenomenon.

These are the intractable consequences of the uprising. Instead of a positive payoff, which could very well have happened, we are now facing mounting losses on both sides. Abandoning the uprising by the Palestinians at this point would not only be admitting the failure of a policy but also mean bearing the consequences of such a failure, namely, a weak position in future negotiations.

However, continuing to engage in a mistaken policy that has proven only negative payoffs by pursuing it even more stringently is sheer nonsense. Israelis, although losing their sense of security, are not experiencing life under curfew or 65 percent unemployment. And yet, if humans are rational beings, and the Intifada has not worked, why do Palestinians not abandon their struggle?

My belief is that the answer lies in the fact that Palestinians living day to day inside the territories are constantly bombarded by a well-functioning propaganda machine that chooses to institute rationality in concepts only of interest to those in power. And let me be clear: I do not mean only the Palestinian authority, but especially the Syrian backed Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, which by de facto control the social safety net.

It is a machine that instills pride in suicide bombings and one that promises a total annihilation of Israel; it is a machine that encourages children to risk their lives by throwing stones at armored tanks because it is brave, and because it will be shown in newspapers around the world. It may seem surprising to some, but 43 percent of the Palestinian population currently believes that the Intifada should end only by the liberation of all of historic Palestine, (read: extinction of Israel). With such expectations, how can one foresee an end to this conflict?

The hard truth is that the Intifada has failed. Defending it only deepens the already great divide between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and offers absolutely no positive future payoff. Instead of searching for reasons that suicide bombers exist, we should be focusing on ensuring that the Palestinians are not fooled into believing that impossible concessions can be achieved through violent struggle.

By accepting the behavior of suicide bombings, we implicitly give reason to their existence and justify their cause, protecting the leaders that have created them. The Palestinians deserve a land and a government. But, they also deserve a free press, an unbiased education system, and a democratic government. Only this will allow them to act rationally and pursue their best interests, which surely includes understanding the inefficiency of pursuing their interests through suicide bombing.



Daniel Ades is a second year graduate student at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy