Faith first

I value my Christian faith infinitely more than I value democracy. Were I forced at gunpoint to relinquish one or the other, I would gladly hand over my social security card and hop on the next flight to Cuba or China. I would give a lot to defend democracy, but my greatest devotion belongs to my faith. This might sound odd on a campus where the Chapel is locked and the library is open on a Sunday morning.

Tufts' own luminous Daniel Dennett finds my view strange, and thinks he has a responsibility to make me feel "very uncomfortable" (Primary Source interview, Nov. 20). He specifically worries about people who "put [their] faith above [their] allegiance to democracy. Because there are a lot of people in this country who do: they are Catholics or Baptists first and democrats or Americans second. We should make those people feel very uncomfortable."

Dennett has a good point: how could anyone value faith over a government that protects rights and liberties?

First, the problem with 'democracy first' is that the freedom it provides me is temporary; it will only last as long as my life. The second I cease to breathe, I believe that I pass on to a place where my citizenship affords me no security. I am told that in this place, another law altogether will determine my status, and that my political freedom can do me no good.

Christianity, in contrast, promises eternal freedom. Jesus himself said: "My Father's will is that everyone who looks to the Son and believes in him shall have eternal life." He promised an eternal freedom that would not come and go with the whims of political and military leaders.

Christianity provides something that democracy cannot. While democracy protects my right to "be" whoever I am, Christianity promises that God will improve me, working something better within me than I could myself, developing things like joy, patience, faithfulness, and self-control (Galatians 5:22). Democracy is thus very good for me, but God is infinitely greater.

Secondly, there should still be a "comfortable" place for me in democracy. A democracy is a forum where strong opinions are not only protected, but can be voted on. Agendas are ubiquitous; environmentalists, socialists, and libertarians vote their agendas regularly. Should the Christian be excluded from political activity simply because a Christian's political beliefs may be informed by their faith? Harvard Law student Nels Peterson says otherwise: "To suggest that upon election an official has to park his beliefs at the door and never refer to them for the four years he is in office is a rejection of our entire history... and is remarkably asinine, and not in keeping with what the vast majority of people want... Requiring [legislators] to make only secular arguments is requiring them to hide the true reasons for their beliefs. It is fundamentally unjust to say to a group of people you have to make up reasons for what you believe in order to sit in the public square along with everybody else."

It would in fact be unconstitutional to mandate that legislators sever their religious beliefs from policymaking. This reality is essential to the function of our democracy; the Constitution has never purported to prevent or promote the motivations of legislators -- only legislation falls within its influence. As Nels puts it, "If somebody goes out and says, 'I support X because I'm a Christian, and because that's what I feel my religion requires me to support,' they may not be effective in convincing people to agree with them, but their policy proposal may be a good idea."

"What about separation of church and state?" one might ask. The Constitutional Amendment in question in fact only prohibits government advocacy of a specific faith -- it says nothing about a legislator expressing his personal views through his legislation. The difference is highly nuanced and difficult, but important. Our courts have interpreted this "separation" to apply to the effects of a law rather than the motivation behind it. A Christian congressman or president may propose any legislation as long as it reflects a viable secular purpose that is not restricted to members of a specific faith. It is thus unconstitutional to mandate attendance in church, but permissible to present pro-life legislation because of one's religious views. "The protection of human life above all else" is a valid secular purpose that reflects the interests of a large majority of the voting public.

The voting public in conjunction with the Constitution is the denominator for our democracy; we vote our interests to ensure that the "checks and balances" work, and that nothing can be done without majority consent. The Constitution is only a measuring stick against which the courts assess our laws, and we can lengthen or shorten this stick. Democracy does not therefore have to be our greatest good; the legislator can be a Christian before a democrat. Only in the judicial branch must the Constitution come before Christianity. There is nothing insidious or undemocratic about this system; that is how democracy is supposed to work.

Dennett is terrified that a voting majority might choose legislators unfavorable to his own "bright" views. His first great error is his failure to recognize that the fundamental authority in our democracy comes not from the Constitution, but from the voting majority. Democracy is not in itself our greatest interest; it is only a forum for us to express deeper truths.

In his book "The Culture of Disbelief," Yale Law professor Stephen Carter argues that the attempt to exclude religious motivation from the public square is itself a violation of the First Amendment; the attempt, he says, to turn faith into a "hobby" that should not be brought into political life is demeaning and unconstitutional.

Daniel Dennett, however, wants Christianity to remain a social hobby, claiming that a Christian who believes in his shallow parody of "an Old Testament God that smites the enemies and wants to be praised and adored and told how great he is" is "crazy." Dennett sees no role for "crazy" faith in our democracy, but democracy fortunately protects the right of the voter and legislator to express ideas that others disagree with. Dennett can try to make "those people feel very uncomfortable," but I think that fear lurks close behind his fallacy -- the fear that perhaps God (and democracy) might turn out to be a bit more than Dennett has bargained for.

Matthew Dysart is a senior majoring in English.