It was with great pleasure that I read Professor Goldstein's Viewpoint, "Preparing for War with Iran" on Feb. 21. This eloquently written piece is very articulate in its claims and reasonable in its conclusions. However, in the interest of stimulating debate, I must firmly dissent from Professor Goldstein's opinion: the United States is not about to involve itself in a war with Iran.
I am not one to ignore what appear to be blatant facts and, like most Tufts students, I hardly support the Bush administration's Middle East foreign policy. However, living less than 20 miles from Israel's presumed nuclear arsenal in Dimona (likely one of Iran's primary targets in a counter-strike) gives me a different perspective on the issue of Iran than that held by somebody back at Tufts. Thus, I offer the following:
Professor Goldstein focuses on the fear that Iran is developing into something of an Iraq II (III?). But it is because of Iraq itself that the United States will not invade Iran. The United States currently lacks the capability to involve itself in another offensive war.
Say what you want about the Bush administration, but at least give it the credit to know that Iraq is going badly. With Congress passing bills against the war and a new (highly disapproved of) troop increase, the administration has incurred enough PR damage without sending troops into a new conflict. A second-term, lame-duck president's interests lie in his or her historical legacy, not in expanding one of the most controversial wars in U.S. history.
Goldstein asserts that "there is much more at stake here than public relations." Hardly. According to a CBS poll released on Feb. 27, President Bush's approval rating for the Iraq War stands at 30 percent, with a job approval rating of 34 percent.
Furthermore, only 20 percent consider Iran a "threat requiring military action now," while 55 percent say Iran is a "threat that can be contained with diplomacy" and 19 percent do not even consider it a threat to the United States.
Intuitive in these numbers is that the approval rating for a war has significant effects on the president's general approval. This translates into a significant effect on politics. Thus, with the President's 30 percent Iraq approval rating and a Republican party struggling in the midst of a Democratic coup to get in shape for the 2008 elections, a decision to invade Iran is neither self-preserving nor strategic on the part of the Bush administration. And it is this common sense that gives us assurance that Iran will not soon come under U.S. attack.
In fact, it is Iran's knowledge of this fact that has secured the country thus far. Why else would it pursue the exact same course of action that brought an end to the regime of its Iraqi neighbor?
Perhaps the United States lacked intelligence in linking Iraq to weapons of mass destruction. But Iranian President Ahmadinejad openly proclaims the right of his state to seek nuclear capability, and reports on the progress of this capability complete with color photographs. The evidence is not only there, it's being handed to the United States on a silver platter!
This leads to the question of nuclear capability itself. Goldstein's viewpoint points out that Iran has no nuclear weapons, and that the entire ordeal "probably [has] been orchestrated to take some of the heat off the Bush-Cheney disaster in Iraq."
While I question the ability of "Bush-Cheney" to orchestrate anything successfully, the point of whether or not capability is current or upcoming is irrelevant when the issue of regional political security - and global economic stability - is at stake.
This view is shared not only within the U.S. government, but also among the EU, United Nations and several states including Israel, Russia and China, pinpointing it far from the conspiratorial folly elucidated in Goldstein's viewpoint.
Iran is not only assertive, it is militant, and on many levels, very dangerous. While ironic, it is this threat that is deterring (successfully) the United States from involving itself in a war with Iran.
So what conclusion can be drawn from the movement of the Carrier Battle Groups into the Gulf and similar military escalations? The plain answer is deterrence. Knowing that the United States is unlikely to attack is the primary incentive for Iran to openly pursue nuclear capability.
In essence, the situation is a high-stakes poker game. And now, the United States riskily, but necessarily, is calling Iran's bluff.
As anyone who has not sufficiently studied for an essay test can tell you, ambiguity is the best policy. It gains the most amount of credibility with the least amount of effort. The United States doesn't have to convince Iran that they will attack, only that they might. And the word "might" becomes a stronger word with Carrier Battle Groups behind it, as a "precaution." It's coercive diplomacy 101.
Goldstein's viewpoint also egregiously omits the international efforts that go along with U.S. policy. Sanctions from the EU, for example, are being taken very seriously by Iran. Russia and China are also involved, despite it being against their own oil interests. And of course, there is the Israel aspect. Israel's 1981 Osirak strike on a nuclear site in Iraq lends credibility to the rhetoric coming almost weekly out of Jerusalem: If Israel feels threatened, it will not wait to be struck.
But after this summer's war with Lebanon, theoretically, even if Israel did strike, the result would be much less than a war, as Israeli public opinion and resignation of the Israeli Army Chief of Staff limit capability.
So while I respect Professor Goldstein's opinions, the assumptions and underlying motivations on which these opinions are based must be reconsidered. Whether it be lack of troops, lack of support, lack of efficacy, lack of coercive power or lack of need, the United States is far from following through on its threats. And perhaps the media is not shirking its duty to inform, but rather upholding its duty not to unduly alarm the American people based on a synthesis of facts which is ultimately flawed.
Scott Weiner is a junior majoring in international relations with a concentration on the Middle East.
