Inside MLB | Royals build with coherent plan under Moore

    The Kansas City Royals have experienced so many lows in the last decade that it is almost unfair to declare one specific event the nadir of the organization. But if a choice must be made, it would have to have been during the team's spring training of 1999.
    After four consecutive losing seasons during which the organization had tried desperately to find starting pitching via every possible avenue, 37-year-old Mike Piechnik was given a non-roster invitation to spring training. Although Piechnik had never played professional baseball in his life -- he had made his previous career as a Canadian fast-pitch softball pitcher -- he nonetheless was given the opportunity to audition for the Royals, whose front office at least considered having him pitch in the 1999 season. Unfortunately, Piechnik balked every time he came to the plate, and the clever experiment died a quiet death.
    There are no Mike Piechniks at the Royals' training camp this year. Although the rotation still consists of Gil Meche, Zach Greinke and an assortment of interesting hopes and dreams, the desperation that brought Piechnik to spring training has largely evaporated. The Royals have recognized that their ineptitude will not be cured easily and are in the midst of a long and deep rebuilding process. They will not contend this year or next year or maybe not even the year after that. The "something, anything to save this ballclub" mentality that led to Piechnik and the infamous Jermaine Dye-for-Neifi Perez trade in 2001 has been replaced by a coherent plan under new general manager Dayton Moore.
    The Royals have committed money to the draft, the first step on the road to building a cheap team in a mid-size media market. They have signed their share of Scott Boras clients, who generally come with high price tags. In 2006, they drafted Luke Hochevar with the first overall pick. His signing bonus cost the Royals $3.5 million. Mike Moustakas was drafted in the first round in 2007 and received $4 million. The Royals paid Eric Hosmer, the third overall pick in 2008, $6 million. The organization is not being stingy in the one area that can give it cost-effective returns and is looking to build a solid base for success in the future.
    Moore, the man behind the Royals' future, worked in the Atlanta Braves' organization before interviewing for the Boston Red Sox' GM opening in 2005, subsequently withdrawing his nomination and replacing Royals GM Allard Baird in 2006. Baird, who now coincidentally enough works as an adviser for Red Sox general manager Theo Epstein, was responsible for trading away Dye, Johnny Damon and Carlos Beltran. The Royals posted three 100-loss seasons under Baird's six-year watch.
    Moore came in and talked the talk. He said he took the job because he had been handed complete autonomy and control over player personnel by ownership. He said the team needed to get younger and do a better job building from within. Moore has certainly walked the walk, especially with his drafting and building of a deep farm system.
    But Moore has not been able to get out from under the old Royals malaise. The Royals finished 75-87 last season, fourth in the AL Central. For a young rebuilding team, it wasn't a terrible showing. The team has serious problems, however. Only four hitters posted a double-digit value over replacement player (VORP) last season. One of those four, Mark Grudzielanek left the team in the offseason; another was rookie Mike Aviles with an unsustainably lucky .325 batting average. The team posted a collective .320 on-base percentage, good for 12th in the league.
    Any good general manager goes out and targets his weaknesses, and Moore swore up and down that the Royals would make moves to improve their on-base percentage -- but then traded for Mike Jacobs. Jacobs' career OBP is .318 and he has power but no eye to speak of. He also has a sizeable platoon split that renders him nearly useless against lefties and is only average defensively.
    Competing for playing time at DH and first base are youngster Billy Butler and prospect Kila Ka'aihue. Butler posted a very respectable .291/.353/.456 line last season for the Royals. Ka'aihue led the minors in walks, splitting time between the Double-A and Triple-A, and has extreme raw power. He earned himself a September call-up to the majors, where he did not look out of place. Between Butler, a solid right-handed bat, and Ka'aihue, a potential lefty powerhouse, it seems that the Royals should be all set at first base and DH for the 2009 season.
    For some reason, Moore saw it fit to throw in another left-handed bat and add weight to his bottom line. Jacobs makes $3.25 million, which is enough money to sign at least one over-slot draft pick in the 2009 entry draft, but he is not a piece of the Royals' future. For a team that didn't keep its superior players in Dye and Beltran, it's highly unlikely that they would keep a one-tool first baseman for millions of dollars. The only things that he will manage to accomplish in his brief tenure with the Royals will be smacking roughly 20-30 dingers, posting an OBP barely above .300 and taking away from the development of Ka'aihue and Butler.
    It's no wonder that the team hasn't made the playoffs since George Brett led the 1985 Royals to their first and only World Series title. The trade for Jacobs shows a lack of strategic planning. A guy that hit 32 jacks last year was available for the low, low price of one lightly-used Leo Nunez and $3.25 million. Moore pulled the trigger seemingly without considering how Jacobs fit into the Royals' future. That's a good way to make sure that your team doesn't reach the playoffs for another 25 years.