Seth Jones retells in his book "In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan" a joke heard across Afghanistan today: "An Afghan goes in to see the Minister of the Interior. ‘Minister,' he pleads, ‘you need to fix the growing corruption problem in our government. The people are becoming increasingly frustrated with government officials who are corrupt and self−serving.' After listening carefully, the minister responds: ‘You have convinced me there is a problem. Now how much money will you give me to fix it?'"
Unfortunately, if this were a true story, most Afghans would believe it. By almost any measurement, the Afghan government has failed its people. Today, commanders and U.N. diplomats have declared that the principal threat to the stability of Afghanistan is its own government. President Hamid Karzai has decomposed from a national leader into the "mayor of Kabul." Systemic corruption in the ministries has undercut the rule of law and economic prosperity. Alongside minimal population security, this has empowered the Taliban insurgency. Preventing failure in Afghanistan requires a comprehensive approach that decentralizes power down to the tribal level while giving Afghans enough confidence in the central state that they do not seek to overthrow it.
First, the United States and NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) must provide population security in Afghanistan. While the inefficacy of the government has turned Afghans to the Taliban, much of that support is the result of coercion. The cost of aligning with the government and international forces is death. Security forces have not been able to hold onto territory and protect the population. The result is that Afghans assume the international community is complicit in the failures of the government and does not actually wish to defeat the Taliban. International troops must maintain a long−term presence within the country. This will aid governmental reform, as officials know that the international community will not be leaving soon. While a stated date for withdrawal can be used as leverage, it is crucial to change the conventional wisdom among the Taliban that "NATO has all the watches, but we have all the time."
The United States and NATO ISAF must also present a cohesive message for the Afghan government. Like many other aspects of the mission in Afghanistan, coordination with President Karzai has been fragmented by the diversity of interests. Often, the president is given contradictory messages by the different nations of the coalition. For example, when Karzai tried to arrest Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum for assaulting a political rival, Turkey — a major donor supporting Dostum — opposed the move, and today Dostum is a member of the Karzai administration. Likewise, the Americans have supported former Minister of the Interior Zarar Ahmad Muqbil even though he is notorious for kickbacks and graft. While the international community speaks of transparent democracy, it has consistently supported its own strongmen at the expense of Afghans. Reform entails a unified approach among the coalition that does not place Karzai in a position in which in order to satisfy everyone, he dissatisfies the Afghan people.
One option discussed by the U.N. recently was to replace Karzai outside of the electoral process. By forcing out Karzai, the U.S. and NATO ISAF would have a clean slate to work with. They would also be able to install a leader who aligns with their interests. However, simply removing the president would not change the inherent problems within the government today. In fact, overthrowing Karzai through extralegal means and replacing him with a Western puppet may only alienate Afghans further. Additionally, Karzai's "big tent" style of governance makes him the only leader who can reach out to the political factions. While this policy has accommodated and empowered the warlords, there is no guarantee that a Western technocrat could resolve the myriad of tribal divisions of Afghanistan.
One crucial program that may bring Karzai desperately needed legitimacy is a long−sought action plan for transitional justice that would finally examine the human rights crimes of the past thirty years. Such a process would involve the central government and judicial sector as well as the United Nations in a vetting process, truth commissions and possibly prosecutions. At the very least, an action plan could begin to remove the cynicism that Afghans have towards their government.
There must be a focus within government ministries on locating and correcting corruption. The U.S. and international communities should institute Offices of Inspectors General and create ombudsmen who report to the people and record their complaints. The Taliban have already established this position in areas they control. At the national level, the Ministry of the Interior is crucial for reform efforts, since it is responsible for internal security and counter narcotics. Donor aid must be conditional on comprehensive reform of the Ministry of the Interior, and there must be a unified vision for the Afghan National Police as either law and order or counterinsurgency units.
The capacity−building of these institutions must be relevant to the Afghan environment. For police work to be productive, the justice system should be strengthened and built on tribal practices. Likewise, Western contractors like DynCorp International cannot train policemen based on tactics learned in American metropolises. Rather, capacity−building must be congruent with cultural norms and constraints. Any minister or police chief in Afghanistan is in power today because he knows how to work the system. Imposing Western standards upon them is a failure to recognize the reality in which the international community must operate.
Ultimately, any political solution that accommodates Western interests will have to distribute power outside of Kabul. While still supporting measures to improve the central government, the U.S. and NATO must also empower informal tribal networks. A connection with the government is necessary, but these local power brokers should be given autonomy. An example of a successful program is the National Solidarity Program (NSP), which disperses grants to village−level elected councils who determine priorities for the community and distribute the grants for micro−development projects. Through the NSP, over 19,000 project plans have been implemented.
Another example is the National Rural Access Program, which has restored 9,000 km of roads, bringing infrastructure and employment to communities. David Kilcullen writes that "roads ain't roads," but instead represent a long−term commitment by international forces and the government to the people. By securing an area, working with the people to identify needs, employing and empowering them, roads projects "generate progress across all the dimensions of counterinsurgency." When they know that the government is funding projects that satisfy needs, Afghans are more likely to turn away from the Taliban.
Transparency International recently named Afghanistan the second−most corrupt country in the world, behind only Somalia. This is primarily a result of neglect, myopia and hypocrisy on the part of the international community. The duty now is for Western leaders to acknowledge those failures and correct them with a coherent plan. Otherwise, if "‘Karzai Incorporated'" is tolerated, then the West will soon fail in Afghanistan.
The Education for Public Inquiry and International Citizenship (EPIIC) program at Tufts University especially focuses on these great issues. If you wish to continue this discussion and learn more about the South Asian region, attend the EPIIC Symposium 2010 from Feb. 17−21 in Cabot Auditorium.
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Arjun Verma is a junior majoring in International Relations. He is a student in this year's EPIIC colloquium.
