“I don’t think anybody believes those elections will be free or fair. I don’t think anybody believes elections will contribute to the solution of the problems of Myanmar.” These were the words of United Nations Secretary General António Guterres on the upcoming Burmese elections during his attendance of the late October Association of Southeast Asian Nations Summit in Kuala Lumpur.
In late November, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights released a statement on the troubling nature of the upcoming ballots, noting that the election would be conducted in an environment “rife with threats and violence.”
According to election authorities, out of the country’s 330 townships, 56 will be excluded from the first round of elections, with 172 still “in limbo,” — neither included nor excluded in election processes.
Yet little has been done beyond the U.N. taking a tough public stance on the matter — though this is not meant to discredit the organization’s humanitarian aid efforts in the country. Since the February 2021 coup, the Security Council has only adopted Security Council Resolution 2669 as its single binding resolution related to the ongoing conflict.
It calls for a cessation of violence, urges the junta and related parties to release political prisoners and promote democratic institutions and highlights the role of the ASEAN regional bloc in mediating dialogue and adopting a government in the interest of the people. It addresses the humanitarian plight of the Rohingya peoples, though it stops short of explicitly condemning any party for perpetrating related abuses.
The resolution also states that the Security Council will remain seized of the matter, meaning the issue remains on its agenda and can be revisited to vote on further measures as needed.
During the upcoming private meeting of the Security Council on Myanmar this month, the resolution must be hammered out to provide clear, actionable items by which the Council can further work to support civilians in Burma and ensure them a free and fair future.
ASEAN and the implementation of their Five-Point Consensus peace roadmap should generally be the focal point of any Security Council engagement in Burma. It should not be an external, removed body in New York deciding what is best for the region from afar, but rather the regional actors in Jakarta who have a far more intricate and personal understanding of a matter that lies squarely within their own neighborhood.
The U.N. has conceded this much, with much of the language in Resolution 2669 emphasizing the need to strengthen coordination with the 5PC and reaffirming the central role of ASEAN in mediating a conclusion to the conflict and clearing a path towards a genuine democratic transition.
While it may be difficult to make any progress on more interventionist measures owing to China and Russia’s close relationship with the junta and past resistance to any such actions, meaningful progress can still be made on a number of the resolution’s points.
For instance, China has already voiced support for a democratic transition in the country and has repeatedly backed ASEAN centrality in this process. Beijing would therefore likely vote favorably on initiatives aimed at expanding democratic institutions which are implemented directly through ASEAN mechanisms.
Russia may be a harder actor to reconcile even these proposals with, since it has expressed opposition to ASEAN-led mediation. Still, careful diplomacy and emphasizing regional interests could open up a path to limited engagement.
The Security Council is the sword of the U.N., able to take decisive, punitive and coercive action where other organs of the U.N. are not, and must now be wielded properly to ensure that the upcoming elections in Burma do not further destabilize a country already far past the brink of collapse.
