Second Thoughts
February 16Last year in these pages I wrote a few columns about the impending, and then actual, war against Saddam Hussein. I argued that war can be both necessary and just when there remains no other option to stop an aggressive threat to the peace. I concluded that inspections were futile against a power hungry dictator who denied the existence of the weapons he held. The war would be just, I thought, to remove the man from his weapons. Now that it appears he did not have the weapons that everyone thought he did, I've had to do some rethinking. Was the war unjust after all? There are some who argue that failure to find stockpiles of weapons changes nothing. Saddam was a horrible dictator, they say, who filled mass graves with his own people and used whatever money he didn't spend on pleasure palaces he used to fund terrorism. The world is a better place, they argue, with him out of power. And this is very true. But it doesn't really answer our question, which is, "was the war just?" To those who deny that notions of "right" and "wrong" have any meaning, the question is pointless from the start. For those who believe no person is free to do whatever their heart desires, but that all are obliged to do the right thing and shun the wrong thing, still divide among themselves on how one discovers what the right thing is. In general there are two camps, dividing on where rightness can be found: in an action or in its consequences. The latter group asks, are the results good? If so, then it does not matter what actions one takes to get the results, so long as the consequences are advantageous. That is the thinking behind those who say the Iraq war was just for the sole reason that Saddam is gone. The other group, before looking at any consequences, asks, is this action good? The presupposition is that there are some acts which are intrinsically wrong and can never be justified no matter what advantages come from it. Chattel slavery, for example, can never be justified by the amount of wealth it creates for others. Or, an innocent man ought never be condemned by the court, no matter what peace of mind it may bring to society. In general, evil can never be done so that good may come. It is from this group of thinkers that the concept of "just war" has come. In "just war" thinking, the aim of war is to protect the innocent and preserve the peace. Since the murder of the innocent is an intrinsically wrong act, war can be justified to stop it so long as the war itself does not murder innocents. As soon as a lasting, grave threat to the public peace becomes certain, war becomes justified, if not obligatory. In the months before the Iraq war, the claim was that such a time had arrived. The public peace of order and the lives of innocents were, as George Weigel put it, "under grave threat when aggressive regimes acquire weapons of mass destruction -- weapons that we must assume, on the basis of their treatment of their own citizens, these regimes will not hesitate to use against others." It was proposed that a just war need not wait for an actual attack. Weigel asked, "Can we not say that, in the hands of certain kinds of states, the mere possession of weapons of mass destruction constitutes an aggression -- or, at the very least, an aggression waiting to happen?" Many, including myself, agreed. To this date, however, no stockpiles have been found. Does this make the reason for the war false, and thus the war unjust? It is a question harder to answer than it seems. In the first place, the absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence. The Iraq Survey Group is still, says CIA Director George Tenet, searching for "weapons, people, and data" and is "nowhere near 86 percent finished". There may be surprises. Weapons and evidence may have been destroyed, or moved out of Iraq, in the weeks before and during the war. The threat may have been real indeed. We have to wait for more truth to come to light. Secondly, while Tenet admits that Saddam did not have nuclear weapons, nor does it appear that he had ready-to-use biological or chemical weapons, Saddam did have "the intent and capacity" to get them. In other words, Saddam was not repentant. He did not renounce his evil ways and become a kingly philanthropist. In fact, the U.S. has found its proof that Saddam was actively pursuing ballistic missile technology prohibited by the U.N.. The U.S. did not invade a country lead by a kindly old man whose watering bucket was accused of being a machine gun. Not only did he want these weapons, there was certainly no sign that his sons would give up the quest when they eventually succeeded him. We're confronted by the question, is a rogue state that wants but does not yet have weapons as much a threat as a rogue state that does have them? Is the danger to innocent life and the public peace not yet certain enough? Suppose we could have certainly kept the weapons Saddam desired out of his hands with constant obstruction. Does this protect the lives of his innocent citizens or preserve the public peace within his nation? If the international community has to subject an entire nation to strangling sanctions and policing in order to frustrate the designs of one man, hasn't that man made himself an aggressor to his own people? Is he himself a grave, lasting, and certain threat? Would it then be justified to remove him from power, using international war if necessary? I do not know the answer to these questions. Every time we stretch the definition of what a "just cause" might be we run the risk of making it mean whatever we want it to mean. Suppose that the worst has happened, and that Iraq's weapons really did go over into, says, Syria. If our intelligence only hints at that, though, is that grounds enough for the U.S. to start demanding Syria to comply with inspections? How can we trust our information? I was under the impression last year that the administration had plenty of strong and clear evidence that it just could not reveal to the public. Do policy makers have an obligation to refrain from making war until the grounds for that war are conclusively know? That of course puts us in a very vulnerable position. But is it the right thing to do? Jack Grimes is a senior majoring in Philosophy.

