Last week's political turbulence in Venezuela seems to reaffirm the growing notion that Latin America is still one of the most backward and unstable regions on this planet. Despite the wave of promising economic and political reforms on which several Latin American states embarked during the 1990's, the most recent events around the continent underscore a sharp regression in both fields.
The clumsy tug-of-war for power in Venezuela is only the latest of these mishaps, joining the Argentine financial crisis, the vicious war in Colombia, and the collapse of the Fujimori government in Peru in a tragic list of setbacks for the region. Indeed, there is little source of optimism in Latin America these days. But why do Latin American countries seem unable to overcome this recurrent cycle of economic stagnation and political turmoil? What are the underlying reasons for this endemic chaos? There are no absolute answers to these questions, but the latest crisis in Venezuela reveals a strong insight.
The deep social inequalities that have prevailed in Venezuela over the decades have developed into an irreconcilable clash between the upper and lower classes. This extensive socio-economic divide is mainly responsible for the pervasive unsustainability of democratic institutions. Last week's events are an example of just that. A thorough examination of the causes of this seemingly ordinary (in the context of the region) and yet remarkably revealing Venezuelan crisis can help us better understand the challenges Latin American nations face.
Venezuela has had a long history of antagonism between the different social classes. This tension grew considerably during the rule of the corrupt right-wing governing class that preceded the infamous current president, Hugo Chavez. Chavez understood the lower classes' frustration with the ruling elite and made his way to the presidency by exploiting the social divide to his favor. He entered the Venezuelan government with one foot already outside the realm of democracy. On Feb. 12, 1992 he attempted a coup against then president Carlos Andres Perez. The attempt failed miserably and Chavez was sentenced to two years of prison.
So the second time around, he tried to reach power through democratic means. Chavez created his power base by targeting the needs and wants of the poorest classes in the Venezuelan society. The latter had been marginalized and had grown in number and discontent throughout the previous presidency
His formula worked, and he was elected on December 1998, with 56.2% of the votes. As soon as he assumed power in 1999, he announced a referendum in which the approval would grant him exceptional powers and a reformed version of the Venezuelan constitution. Although the electorate did concede to these radical desires, only half of the Venezuelan population went to the polls.
But Chavez's leftist tendencies and need for extra-democratic measures did not stop there. In the year 2000, he began expropriating land based on his own criteria and began making other sorts of social promises.
The more radical the president became, the further he alienated members of his own political party and the further he divided the already unequal Venezuelan society. Civil and military members of the MVR party disjointed and Chavez aligned with the civil representatives. Furthermore, his populist parlance and leftist political actions alienated the industrial sector of society and much of the developed world.
Chavez, however, continued to have the majority support (mainly from the lower classes) and was re-elected in 2000 with 59% of the votes. He again obtained special powers from the National Assembly so that he could legislate by decree for one year in the economic, social, and public administration sectors. With these powers, he passed 49 new laws, which caused repudiation from the business sector.
And then the social situation mutated from tight to explosive. Strikes organized by leaders of the industrial sector and supported by the major unions in the country, such as the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV) took place in December 2001 with wide support.
Matters got much worse when the top leaders of the state-managed oil company, PDVSA, decided to disregard Chavez's new laws. And then, in a matter of days, Venezuelan affairs reached the front covers of newspapers worldwide when the police clashed with protesters and the images of strikes showed disgraceful violence.
The Venezuelan people, led by the angered industrial sector, turned against their President and asked for his resignation. Pedro Carmona, one of the head haunches of PDVSA, thus assumed power as interim president.
Twenty-eight hours later- with his ambitious goals stomped and to the astonishment of the world - Carmona was ousted and Chavez returned with a counter-coup, claiming his democratically rightful place on the Venezuelan stage.
It is difficult to draw conclusions at this point; the political sandstorm in Venezuela has yet to settle down, and Chavez's security as president is still shaky. However, one thing is certain. Instead of trying to heal the wounds of Venezuela's social inequality, Chavez made sure they would not stop bleeding. This ultimately worked against him, in the form of an attempted coup, but more importantly, it worked against Venezuela itself. The aftermath of this chaotic week is a generalized sense of frustration, uncertainty, and disenchantment.
Inevitably, a larger problem looms in the horizon: Can other Latin American states fall victim to the same demise of democracy and rule of law? Is the political crisis in Venezuela just another detail in the tumultuous history of Latin America, or can it be viewed as a warning for other nations in the region? The rest of Latin America should take note of this and insist on working out the problems of social inequality in the region before it is too late.
Paloma Cataife and Rodrigo de Haro are sophomores majoring in International Relations and Economics
