sexual orientation n. One's natural preference in sexual partners.
Misunderstanding of the TCUJ's recent decision in the TCF case abounds, and in order to follow our own advice, I will try to clarify our decision. I will first attempt to clarify the individual motions of the decision, and then I will discuss its broader implications.
The difference between Motion One and Motion Two is not obvious. The distinction is that the Senior Leaders' vote was a single, specific instance, while Motion Two refers to a more general pattern of discrimination over an extended period of time. The confusion regarding this difference is probably mostly due to the fact that the hearing was closed, and that no transcript was kept. It was apparent to us because of the testimony given during the hearing.
We decided that the vote described in Motion One, although it created the same outcome as discrimination, was not discrimination. Discrimination entails both action and intent. To use a slightly less loaded example: the Monty Python Society could decide not to accept a gay person as a leader because he hated Monty Python movies. This would have the same outcome as the Monty Python Society not choosing a gay person as a leader because he was gay. The first instance would be perfectly allowable and rational, the second reason would be discrimination covered by Tufts' policy.
Since it became clear to us that this vote was not made because of Julie Catalano's homosexuality, but instead because of a number of outside factors, the intent to discriminate, in the singular instance of the vote, was lacking. Although the outcome was the same, the action was not discriminatory based on Julie's homosexuality.
I believe that there is much less misunderstanding about what Motions Two, Three and Four mean. The broader implications of our decision are far-reaching, and I shall discuss them further. It is important to understand that this decision was not a debate over "Christianity vs. Homosexuality," it was simply a question of the wording of the non-discrimination policy. The broader implications of this decision are very important, especially in regards to the non-discrimination policy. The crux of the debate revolves around the words "sexual orientation," not "discrimination." The Tufts non-discrimination policy states: "Recognized organizations may not discriminate on the grounds of race, color, religion, sex, national or ethnic origin, age, sexual orientation, disability, or an individual's previous affiliations in criteria for membership, assignment of voting privileges, or rank, except as otherwise provided by federal or state law or university policy." (http://studentservices.tufts.edu/pachyderm/student%20organizations.htm#recognize)
Obviously, we had no trouble deciding what the word "discriminate" means. The question, however, is, what do the words "sexual orientation" mean? We did not wish to set Tufts policy, so we used a dictionary. The definition stated that sexual orientation means the sex to which one is attracted. The dictionary we used does not state that sexual orientation means identity.
To back up this definition was Julie's own testimony. During her freshman and sophomore years, Julie was an open bisexual. She believed that homosexuality was not biblically acceptable. This helped make up her identity. During her junior year, Julie's beliefs about homosexuality changed, and she came to a self-acceptance of her homosexuality. This became part of her identity. Because her sexual orientation was always the same, but her identity changed, her identity is not intrinsically linked to her sexual orientation. In addition, Julie was a leader in TCF, as an open bisexual, as long as she believed that homosexuality was biblically unacceptable. This shows that TCF also made a clear distinction between orientation and the acceptability of this orientation.
Other dictionaries may define sexual orientation differently. This is a problem. In addition, some have claimed that a dictionary is not a valid source for this definition, since it may itself be discriminatory. For example, an antebellum dictionary might describe African-Americans as nonhumans. But if the dictionary is not a valid source for a definition, then what is? Seven students? This argument coincides with the TCUJ's recommendation that Tufts define the terms of the non-discrimination policy.
What we wish to have clarified is not the word discrimination, but the groups that are protected. Are self-accepting homosexuals protected? Are self-accepting straight white Christian males? What exactly is the meaning of the word religion? Once again, the dictionary provides little help. There are seven definitions of religion in the dictionary we used.
Nowhere does it state that self-acceptance of one's group affiliation - be it gay, straight, black, white, Christian, or Jewish - is protected. If Tufts intends to protect sexual identity, or the identity of anyone due to their group membership, then Tufts should say so. A one-sentence policy cannot hope to clearly protect ten groups from discrimination.
People may think that we've interpreted the policy incorrectly, but the mere fact that we could interpret it at all vindicates our assertion that it wasn't clear enough. If Tufts truly intends to protect groups from discrimination, then it ought to clearly state its policy, so the TCUJ must never again interpret it. Tufts' policies should not change with the membership or personal politics of the TCUJ. A fickle non-discrimination policy is a worthless one.
Unfortunately, President DiBiaggio has stated that he will wait for TCF to revise its constitution before he comments. In a mass email, he wrote, "Among its findings, the decision rendered by the Tufts Community Union Judiciary earlier this week calls upon Tufts Christian Fellowship to take steps within the next two weeks to comply with the University's non-discrimination policy. During this period, the University will refrain from specific comment on the case while those impacted by the decision reflect, as University officials do, on next steps and possible outcomes." The TCUJ's decision did not specifically state that TCF's old constitution was not in compliance with the non-discrimination policy. The major problem with this constitution is the power given to the InterVarsity Christian Fellowship representative, not with compliance with the non-discrimination policy.
President DiBiaggio also wrote, "I wish to emphasize that Tufts University does and will continue to adhere to the University's non-discrimination policy, which reflects federal and Massachusetts guidelines on non-discrimination." The question remains, what does the University's non-discrimination policy mean? The only way to change TCF's, or any other group's policy towards self-accepting homosexuals, or self-accepting members of any other group, is to change the non-discrimination policy.
I would like to mention that non-discrimination policies have not always been worded in the current fashion, and that one should not feel that they are now written in stone. Several years ago, sexual preference was commonly protected at universities, but it was decided that that word implied choice, so the word was changed to orientation. Why then, could it not be decided that orientation also is not the proper word?
The administration should not hide behind the TCUJ. The TCUJ is charged with upholding the University's policy, and has specifically asked that the Administration clarify this policy. Withholding statement in the interest of allowing students to decide for themselves in this case is farcical.
Once again, this University has the chance to be a leader, to set the standard for our benchmark schools, as well as for schools and governments around the country. The adoption of a meaningful, non-negotiable non-discrimination policy would be a major step in this direction. The Administration must not be timid, but should be a trendsetter by defining exactly whom it intends to protect, and whom it doesn't.
Michael Ferenczy is a junior majoring in Chemical Engineering. He is a member of the TCUJ.
