Caution: Heart of darkness ahead

As I said in last week's column, very few nations have zero or negative economic growth. However, a startling number of the countries that do are in sub-Saharan Africa. The region as a whole had a negative growth rate during the nineties.

One reason for economic stagnation in Africa is, and has been, the lack of political stability in the region _ not only between countries, but more importantly, within countries as well.

No state exemplifies this more than the Congo. The Congo is a vast country, with many natural resources (such as rubber, which is why Leopold and the Belgians were so eager to get their hands on it in the colonial era), and important inland waterways. After finally winning its independence from Belgium in the 1960s, the Congo (then known as Zaire) was ruled for 32 years by Mobutu Sese Seko.

Mobutu was a horrible person and ruler. However, he was not Communist, which is why the US installed him as dictator and supported him for nearly 30 years. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the US began maneuvering, eventually with success, to remove him.

Mobutu's departure left a vast power vacuum in the Congo; a central government fighting against various militias, and each side with backing from neighbors eager to grab natural resources and power.

Last week, remarkably, the last of these foreign armies (that of Rwanda), left the Congo. This represents a huge opportunity not only for the Congo, but Africa as a whole. If the Congo manages to create a strong central government, capable of maintaining peace and private property rights within the country, and the security of its borders with other countries, it could lead much of sub-Saharan Africa in a drive for democracy and economic prosperity. However, if the Congo remains a failed state, it will breed instability in the region.

There are several reasons why the US should be interested in a strong, stable Congo. The first is that, as I described above, a weak Congo creates a huge power vacuum, and foreign invaders dive in. In part armies invade out of greed, but also out of concern for their own security. Rwanda, for instance, went into the Congo because many of the groups who perpetrated the genocide of 1994 were hiding there and making cross-border raids. This only aggravates the endless list of problems in Africa.

Second, "failed states" are havens for terrorists, extremists, and drug cartels. It is in the US interest to minimize the reach of these organizations.

Third, the US, through its support of Mobutu, bears some of the responsibility for the failure of the Congolese nation-state.

There are many things that the US can and should do to facilitate the creation of a strong, liberal central government in the Congo. The US can make diplomatic statements and put diplomatic pressure on Congolese leaders to resolve their differences peacefully. The US should loudly applaud Rwanda for pulling out of the Congo. The US should be willing to send negotiators _ someone like Jimmy Carter or Richard Holbrooke (who brokered the Dayton Accord) _ to moderate discussion if all sides show interest. The US should work with South Africa, the regional powerhouse who has promised peacekeeping troops in the Congo, towards these ends. The US should make World Bank or other funds available on conditions that peace be maintained and markets left free. The US should heighten efforts to fight the battle against malaria and HIV in Africa.

There are also many things that the US should not do to help the Congo. The US should under no circumstances use military force to help the Congolese with their "emerging democracy" in a region where no core US interests are at stake. This would be asking for a repeat of the disaster in 1993 in Somalia. Neither should the US tie itself too much to any one figure within the Congo, liberal though he may be or seem. This would mean a loss of credibility if and when that figure missteps or becomes unpopular, as happened with post-Cold War Russia and Boris Yeltsin.

The US should support democracy and free markets where they arise, and help countries toward these ends. But American diplomacy must never forget that ends must be aligned with means. Entangling ourselves in a risky commitment to create peace and prosperity in regions that have never known them, where no core US interests are at stake, is to extend US power beyond its means to relatively unimportant ends.

As Secretary of State John Quincy Adams said in 1821 (concerning Greece's war for independence from Turkey), "Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will be America's heart, her benedictions, and her prayers. But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy...She knows well that by once enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication, in the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy and ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standards of freedom..."

The main challenge facing US policymakers today is to choose from our many goals the most important ones, and focus our resources on them. In other words, we have to differentiate between what's worth supporting and what's worth fighting for. In the end, as Adams says, we are the only ones worth fighting for. We support American values. We fight for American security.