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Trans-Atlantic rift: the future of U.S.-EU relations

In many ways, America and Western Europe share a common history. The discovery of the Americas coincided with the rebirth of Europe, and ever since, these cultures have been intrinsically linked. North America and Western Europe came to be referred to as one same culture and civilization: "The West".

Samuel Huntington, in his essay "The Clash of Civilizations", describes the essence of modern conflict as linked to the clashing of the different civilizations of the world, and he quite naturally assumes that Western Europe and North America share the same fundamental cultural identity. Why then, since 1989, is the gap between these two main pillars of the world economic and political order incessantly growing? Why is there such tremendous ideological animosity between these siblings?

Historically, important political alliances have seldom, if ever, been consolidated on the premises of friendship or compassion. They have always been based on a more realist concept of interdependence. This fact is self evident when considering the relationship between Western Europe and the United States during the second half of the twentieth century.

However, although alliances can be made quickly and conveniently, the unmaking of them is often rough and conflictual. We are witnessing this divorce in the daily news. Europe and the United States have been experiencing a decline in interdependence since the end of the Cold War, which culminated on Sept. 11, 2001, thus sparking a significant divergence in ideological and geo-political interests.

Much of the problem lies in the outcome of the Cold War. Neither the United States nor the middle-sized countries know exactly what their role is. During the Cold War, these countries knew what positions they held in the world order. Nations were either capitalist or communist. Capitalist countries were subordinated, economically and military, to the United States, and communist countries were subordinated to the Soviets (economically, militarily and politically). Europe and the United States were bound together by necessity, just as the Allies and the Soviets were during WWII. However, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the alliance lost its motor.

For ten years, the two members kept their bonds by custom, but gradually, the relationship seems to be based on economic rivalry rather than common interest. Europeans do not share the same fear or threat of terrorism, and the United States is mostly impervious to the perils that lay in Europe's way. Furthermore, America sees the end of the Cold War as the great triumph of capitalism and liberal democracy, while Europe considers it more as a fitting outcome; a loosening of tension, and a seal to the war-free haven that Europe has become.

Another thing that fuels the animosity between the two is that neither the United States nor Europe is quite sure whether the larger European countries should continue using great power policies or if they should blend into the mold of small nations. In other words, should nations like Germany, France or England continue investing in all economic sectors, or should they invest heavily in a few specific ones? Should they invest seriously in the military and in humanitarian relief aid? Should they invest in aeronautic programs and scientific research? Such ambivalence and confusion from the leading elites in these countries is yet another factor of tension, because it brings out the latent frustration of European nations, with regard to their relative decline on the global arena, which was inhibited during much of the Cold War.

Furthermore, both the United States and its allies hold each other to a double standard. America wants European nations to boost their military funding so that they can share the burden of mediating international conflicts such as the wars with Afghanistan and Iraq. While at the same time the United States declares that it intends to keep its military spending at a level sufficient to dissuade any other nation from trying to compete.

On the other side, European nations have lately been judiciously choosing to oppose the United States on certain issues in order gain power as moral superiors, while also attempting to profit from the umbrella of their main benefactor. Both the United States and Europe expect the other to cooperate in their respective national strategies, because historically their goals were always compatible. However, since the end of the Cold War, given the present lack of strategic checkmating, the geopolitics of strength play a much greater role in international affairs, rendering unilateral action more appealing to the United States.

Europe is now reacting to its relative decline of global power and influence, while the United States has chosen to start reaping the benefits of its undisputed hegemonic position. It is now time for both members of the old alliance to ask themselves what their role should be in the new world order of the twenty first century.

Both shores of the Atlantic face a pivotal moment in their history; where each has to reevaluate its position vis-? -vis the other, while also reassessing its own identity in an increasingly globalized world. America faces the responsibility of the "benevolent hegemon." It has to have a conscience with its overarching power, and act humbly but responsibly with it. Europe, on the other hand, needs to make peace with the fact that it is no longer the center of the occidental world; and evolve from there on, accepting immigration as part of its new identity.

Michael J Kastoryano is a sophomore majoring in Engineering Physics.