An early prototype of the proposed missile defense system was successfully tested just a few months ago, and presently its production version is entering service. This marks only the early state of the vastly expensive and resource intensive investment in ballistic missile defense. The policy of this administration is admirable in its intent, but questionable in its object.
Missile defense is a funny thing. If it does not work, it will be a huge waste of money, time and effort. If it does work, it could be massively destabilizing. It could frighten opponents that America, in its confidence of surviving a nuclear strike, will feel confident about delivering one. Keeping such a defense exclusive to the United States homeland would also make its allies nervous about whether they could rely on the support of the United States when they would no longer be similarly situated in relation to nuclear threats of a ballistic delivery nature. Furthermore, with the end of the state-actor level Cold War and commencement of the current war, with non-state actors playing protagonist roles, it seems odd to emphasize the necessity for such a defense system.
It pays then to take a closer look. A missile defense policy must be predicated on three levels of validation. To begin with the fundamental policy challenge is to ask, "Defend against whom?" In the post-Cold War era, there remain nuclear "rogue" states, but they do not present a ballistic nuclear threat on the scale or with the same propensity as did the Soviet Union. The current threat from non-state actors is unlikely to manifest in ballistic missile technology. Indeed, a rational assessment of their tactics would suggest that they would employ other means of delivery, assuming they acquire nuclear weapons worthy of their characterization as unconventional in tactics and asymmetrical in threat posture.
The second level is empirical - "Will it work?" To be useful as an operational, it should be able to detect and destroy sufficient numbers of attacking missiles in order to 'defend' the homeland. At this point, the technical empiricism gives ground to the fiscal empiricism - "Can America afford to make it work?" The answer in the immediate term, given deficit financing on a grand scale, is probably yes. Of course, the piper will have to be paid someday in real dollars.
All this leads to the question "Does America need this?" The answer, I think, is no. Not only is there variable confidence as to whether the technology is reliable, but even if it were, it is still highly debatable whether a complete defense is possible. Even if it is, in an optimistic scenario, such completeness is only in relation to missile-delivered nuclear threats. It fails to address the current model of an opponent: the terrorist who is more likely to use less-orthodox means to perpetrate a CBRN attack (chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear), such as a large suitcase, for instance.
Several queries naturally arise. Is such a defense stabilizing or destabilizing? Will the technology be shared with America's allies? Is the missile defense system the old story of politicians and generals expensively preparing to fight the last war? Perhaps the paradox can only be resolved if it was posited that the current administration intends missile defense as preparation for the next war - yet another war of choice to finish other 'uncompleted' business. These valid questions need to be confronted by the voting and paying American public. Missile defense is like a clock ticking away time measured in dollars, each hour marking rising levels of international anxiety. It should also stimulate anxiety among a seemingly oblivious American public. Before it chimes its tune, it should be asked, "For whom the bell tolls?"
Devadas Krishnadas is a MALD 2005 candidate in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
