"Cowards cut and run; Marines never do." These were the words of U.S. Representative Jean Schmidt (R-OH) in response to a call by Representative John Murtha (D-PA) for a withdrawal of American troops from Iraq. Though Schmidt's comments were withdrawn from the House record and were repudiated by her Republican colleagues, they are the most concise articulation to date of the position the Bush administration and its Republican allies have taken on American strategy in Iraq. In an effort to continue the debate that the Bush administration is determined to forestall or silence, the logic behind the argument against "cutting and running" must be seriously reviewed and judged on its merits.
There are two serious strands of the argument against withdrawal. The first is popularly known as the "pottery barn" rule. Before the war began, then Secretary of State Colin Powell reportedly told President Bush that, with regard to Iraq, "you break it, you buy it." The United States has a responsibility to the Iraqi people to rebuild Iraq, since the United States invaded and destroyed much of Iraq's political, social, and material infrastructure. This argument appeals to Americans' sense of accountability and moral rectitude. However, American foreign policy should not be about accountability and moral rectitude. American foreign policy should be about promoting American security. The military should not be used to ease our national guilt, or to fulfill our collective humanitarian streak.
The second and most legitimate strand of the argument against withdrawal is that leaving Iraq now would harm American security interests. There are two popular causal links between withdrawal and decreased security cited by proponents of the argument. First, American withdrawal will be an admission of defeat and be seen as a victory for radical Islam. But the significance of such a perception is exaggerated. Just as perceived American defeat in Vietnam did not embolden Communists around the world and lead to American defeat in the Cold War, it is difficult to see how the perception of American defeat in Iraq would have any substantial effect on the global war on terror. Arguments that victory would increase the ranks of terrorist organizations ignore the fact that the American military presence in the Middle East since the first Gulf War has been the most effective recruitment tool radical Islamic groups have at their disposal.
The second, more tangible causal link drawn between withdrawal and a decline in security assumes that withdrawal would lead to civil war, and that a destabilized Iraq would become a haven for terrorists. These assumptions are faulty. The American presence in Iraq is arguably doing as much to foment civil war in Iraq as our absence would. Forty-five percent of Iraqi citizens believe that American troops are a legitimate target for insurgents, and a group of Iraq's political leaders recently proclaimed that attacks on American troops are not to be considered terrorist action. The sight of American soldiers in Iraq serves as a radicalizing force, encouraging violence. The assumption that an Iraqi civil war would result in a Taliban-like state ignores the very different ethnic and social makeup and histories of the two countries. An Iraqi civil war would more likely result in either three distinct states, or a Sunni-dominated autocracy which would, like the Baathist regime that fell with Saddam Hussein, eschew radical Islam.
Unfortunately, no supporter of withdrawal will be given the time to rationally present the case for ending America's military commitment to Iraq. Accusations of cowardice and patriotically meaningless verbal ejaculation will inevitably drown out the voice of reason.
