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Glocal Economics | Banana Republic Insights

BUENOS AIRES, Argentina - Brazil should have theoretically been an ideal country in which to outlaw gun ownership among private citizens. Historically, its crime rates have been devastatingly high. Today, Brazil continues to be a global leader in gun related deaths, and its cities - though beautiful - are among the most violent in the world.

A recent survey released by UNESCO indicates that among 57 countries, Brazil has the second highest gun death rate, with 22 deaths per 100,000 people-Venezuela tops the list. This amounted to one death every 15 minutes. Last year alone, 36,000 people were killed as a result of gun violence throughout Brazil. Additionally because Brazil has a far larger population than Venezuela, it leads the world in gun deaths in absolute terms.

Despite these appalling figures, on Sunday October 23rd, Brazilians voted "no" by a wide margin on a proposed gun sale ban, and it is important to understand why.

One major handicap for the supporters of the ban was that it was strongly endorsed by Brazilian President Luiz Inancio Lula de Silva. Remember how Al Gore didn't want to campaign with Clinton because it would hurt his image following the Lewinsky scandal? In Brazil, the anti-gun camp was bogged down by an increasingly negative view of the Lula administration. The gun lobby was adroitly able to turn the gun ban into a mini-referendum on Lula himself. The endemic distrust of the police also played an important role in the referendum. On top of obvious corruption and judicial incompetence, the Brazilian police forces often operate under a "shoot-to-kill" policy, resulting in deaths of innocent people. Though Lula introduced gun control legislation in 2003 (with some positive results), his financial backing of it has been mediocre. The law prohibits carrying concealed weapons, but because of budget cuts and political scandals, Lula has not been able to restructure and improve the police. In the virtually absence of police reforms, and the public's trust has continued to wane.

The amount of influence that the state is able to wield decreases dramatically as one moves away from the urban centers. In the Amazon or other rural areas, the existence of rule of law is often questioned. Pistoleiros, gunmen, provide a cheap, effective and eerily common way to ensure personal safety or get revenge.

Meanwhile, in the cities, reasons for voting "no" were varied and often flawed. Though the middle-class seems to fear break-ins and muggings, and the lower-class fears gang-wars and street violence, the gun ban would have helped Brazil. Experience has shown that guns are not an effective means to ensure personal security. As a family becomes wealthier, it is able to protect itself in more sophisticated ways. Motion detectors, guards, cameras, bulletproof cars and so forth, are far more effective at deflecting crime than guns might be.

Thus, as the rich are able to more effectively protect themselves, crime begins to fester in other sectors of society. Naturally, the most significant violence occurs in and around Brazil's favelas, shantytowns.

There are other benefits to banning the sale and ownership of guns amongst private citizens. Criminals tend to usually do everything possible to give themselves an advantage over their victims by trying to arm themselves more heavily than their victims. As the general population acquires more and more guns, criminals are increasingly likely to rely on bigger, deadlier weapons, creating an arms race of sorts.

By limiting the number and the type of weapons that is available to the common citizen, criminals will be less inclined to seek out weapons out. Not only will this make overall crime less deadly - people may still get mugged, but they will be less likely to be shot in the process - this will also assist in giving the state some leverage in guaranteeing public safety.

The October 23rd "no" vote has become an important hurdle in enforcing public safety in Brazil. Since the disarmament statue was passed in 2003, there has been an eight percent drop in gun deaths. 2004 marked the first time in 13 years in which there was a decline in gun deaths. Gun control has been working in Brazil, and it should be continued.

Because gun legislation has clearly become intertwined with other political issues, Brazil may be forced to find other means toward the same end. Principally, the police force must be restructured. Budget cuts in this area are totally unacceptable. Police salaries should be raised in order to transform police work into a decent and respectable profession. Corruption at all levels must be stymied. Most importantly perhaps, Brazil should develop special task forces, focused and specifically trained for urban warfare in the favelas.

Official estimates indicate that the referendum cost over $110 million. Perhaps before pursuing costly and risky democratic campaigns, Lula should focus on showing his people tangible results. Only with aggressive - though entirely legal and humanitarian - will the state be able to recuperate the trust of its people and regain a monopoly over the use of domestic force.

Once Brazilians begin to see results and rebuild their trust in elected officials, in terms of security and otherwise, the President will able to receive the votes he wants in national referenda. Until then, we are more likely to see anti-gun and anti-violence legislation approved through back room politicking than through nation-wide voting.