Hamas' unexpected success in the Palestinian election Wednesday has sent shockwaves through the international community. Hamas, a radical Islamist party and a historic sponsor of suicide attacks against Israel, is considered a "terrorist" party by Israel, the United States and the European Union. The implications of the victory are considerable, and are being regarded with some suspicion. President Bush called for Hamas to recognize the need for a "two-state solution" - and by extension, Israel's right to exist - and to renounce its "armed wing."
Israelis - reeling from the loss of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to an incapacitating stroke, and still unnerved by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejan's recent threats to wipe Israel off the map - have reason to be dismayed. The success of such a typically violent party has confirmed many Israelis' suspicions that the Palestinians are not interested in peace; this, in conjunction with their own uncertain political future, has led to a sense of heightened pessimism and concern.
While there is certainly cause for alarm, the Hamas victory may not be an unmitigated catastrophe. Hamas is historically strong on social programs, especially health care and education. At a time when the establishment of domestic law and order tops most Palestinians' list of priorities, a party that can effectively address internal issues is sorely needed. A reduction in desperation among Palestinians will lead to a reduction in resentment, which may lead to a reduction in violence. And while Hamas' charter does call for Israel's annihilation, its leadership has remained silent on the issue for quite some time - and has imposed a yearlong ceasefire that it has said it is willing to extend, if Israel reciprocates.
Hamas' success reflects a deep dissatisfaction with the haplessness of the Palestinian Authority (PA), which completely failed to establish order in Gaza following the Israeli withdrawal. Furthermore, the PA had already proved itself toothless to the point of ridiculousness in cracking down on terrorism. If Hamas directs its considerable organizational strengths toward internal order, domestic programs, and social services - instead of toward terror - and maintains its ceasefire, its presence in the Palestinian government may not prove as disastrous as many anticipate.
But is there any reason to suspect that Hamas will behave so responsibly? It is not yet clear. Hamas has always been a disaffected opposition party, and there is no telling how it will behave when it is in a position of authority. (Indeed, it probably did not fully anticipate the extent of its own margin of victory.) The right-wing military arm of Hamas has supported countless suicide attacks on Israel; whether it will trade in its characteristic violence for the pragmatism that governance requires remains to be seen.
A few things are sure: Hamas presents the best possibility for serious state-building - in the forms of improved health care, education, and other services - that the Palestinians have seen in 40 years. And Hamas enjoys an impressive mandate, conferred by the Palestinians through the Arab world's freest election in recent memory. If it directs its energies toward progress and practicality and leaves foreign affairs to the more moderate Fatah party, Hamas could effect powerful improvement for the Palestinians. Any steps it makes in this direction should be encouraged.
Israel has already refused to negotiate with a Palestinian government that includes Hamas; this decision is understandable, but it is unwise. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has stated that he remains committed to negotiations with Israel, and will conduct them through the Palestinian Liberation Organization if Hamas proves intractable.
In reality, Abbas' already-marginal credibility may have been fatally undercut by the Hamas victory, and his offer of negotiations may never materialize. And in all likelihood, Hamas will refuse to make the philosophic, as well as practical, concessions necessary to be considered a "partner in peace:" the renunciation of violence and recognition of Israel.
But any possibility for a functioning Palestinian government and a workable Middle East peace should be pursued. While intuitively appealing, a knee-jerk refusal to work with the new Palestinian government before it has a chance to surprise us will not promote these objectives.
