Chinese President Hu Jintao's recent visit to the United States has prompted many commentators to examine the current state of Sino-U.S. relations and its future direction. Analysts agree that there was a visible attempt by both states to foster closer economic cooperation. Many key issues, however, remain unresolved, including a realistic valuation of the Chinese currency and key diplomatic negotiations revolving around North Korea and Taiwan. This week we talk to Professor Alan M. Wachman of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, an expert on Sino-U.S. Relations and international politics.
PL: Some commentators have identified a warming in relations between the United States and China, if not necessarily progress on many important issues. Over recent years the two states have seemingly become more enmeshed in foreign policy decisions. How will China look to assert itself more in global affairs?
AW: First, I wouldn't accept the premise that U.S.-China relations are warming. Whether China will exert more influence or allow the United States to take the lead, it very much depends on the issue and how much clout either Beijing or Washington will exert. For example, China will wish very much to exert influence over some issues but not have any clout on others. Both the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are enmeshed in relations, burdened by responsibilities and constraints by certain impediments that make their relationship part of a much broader international system. It's still too vague to just generally say whether China will exert more influence on the foreign stage, because it suggests that it's a type of popularity contest.
PL: President Hu's recent visit to Washington saw him meet with U.S. government and business leaders and consider certain U.S. economic demands, including a realistic valuation of the yuan. How serious are these Chinese pledges?
AW: Well that's a style of diplomacy with very instrumental aims that may have nothing to do with the issues at hand. If the PRC ... understands well that to achieve this broad, long-term aim of building prosperity and power, [then] it needs to avoid being entangled in conflict or economic warfare. It has a very long-range ambition, which it is very consciously trying to affect by avoiding conflict and needless confrontation verbally and militarily. Yes, the PRC leadership comes to the United States, and it understands, as does the U.S. leadership, that there needs to be ... something that journalists can point to as having been a success. Otherwise the whole thing evaporates into a cloud of South Lawn receptions. If Congress doesn't feel like they have gotten something from all the investment they have put in, then relations could falter in a way which would be counterproductive.
PL: President Bush presented the Chinese leadership with a list of human rights cases in China during President Hu's visit. What effect will the U.S. appeal to China's much-criticized human rights record have on state relations?
AW: Well let's assume that Bush gives Hu Jintao a list of two dozen political prisoners. Let's also assume that Hu releases them all. What does that do about human rights in China? It simply reinforces the idea that the judiciary system in China is worthless, is not independent and is open to manipulation by the executive. Is that what we want? A system where the executive takes a list from a foreign leader and releases the prisoners in exchange for a certain amount of goodies in their trade relations? That says nothing about human rights. By the time the political prisoners are in jail, the PRC has already spoken about its commitment to human rights. It's a sham when the U.S. government gives a list of political prisoners asking for their release. The Bush administration, like all its predecessors, will claim a commitment to human rights. But it has nothing to do with the transformation of China's system of imprisoning people for political crimes, mistreating them when they are in prison or holding them without charges. It's all showmanship. If the president of China were to take this list and say that he doesn't have the right as the president of the PRC to force the judiciary, that would say something about the law. I think this whole game is very wrong-headed.
PL: Some American commentators have called for a stronger effort to quit addressing China's economic strengths and instead refocus on making the United States more competitive.
AW: We criticize the Chinese for having such a low wage and for doing so little to protect the welfare of their workers. But who's buying all that stuff manufactured in China? If we really felt strongly about all that stuff, we could stop buying cheap goods. It's just because their workers are paid such low wages, like U.S. workers used to be paid in industries that have now moved to China. Now we are supporting the efforts of our government to bludgeon the Chinese into doing what we, ourselves, decided we didn't want to do? There's a logic here that makes very little sense to me ... Is this a failure of the United States to accept responsibility and address its 'weaknesses'? No, I think it's a failure to put the pieces together and to realize you can't have [it] both ways.
PL: What are the United States' strategies to induce the Chinese to exert pressure on North Korea to return to the bargaining table to address it nuclear weapons program?
AW: There may be an exchange of payment, but it might not be economic. It might have to be with Taiwan, or the U.S. security alliance with Japan. That's the way states function. If a state perceives some way of extracting something that serves its interest from another state, it will do it. Who has more to lose if the North Korean regime collapses? The United States or the PRC? It's the PRC, because they'll have 20 million refugees flooding across their border. Who has more to lose if there's a nuclear confrontation on the Korean peninsula? Again, the PRC. There are plenty of independent reasons why the Chinese will want to manage this crisis. But, if [China] sees a way to leverage itself against the United States, it'll do it to maximize [its] interest.
PL: How do you perceive the PRC's reaction towards a fast developing US-India relationship, with a strengthened India serving as a democratic counterweight to Chinese influence in the region?
AW: With respect to India in particular, the Sino-Indian relationship has its own history of tension and conflict. It may unfold in such a way in the future to either create more tension or more cooperation. What's interesting to think about is the strong likelihood that it is the Indians, out of respect [for] China's rise, who will seek stronger relations with the United States. To see the relationship between Washington and Beijing in isolation is difficult. It's too strongly entangled with the dynamics of international politics in a way that creates a multitude of pressure points, opportunities and constraints.
