The ethnic Albanian leaders of Kosovo declared independence from Serbia Sunday after nearly a decade of turmoil in the former Yugoslavian province.
Classics Department Chair and Professor R. Bruce Hitchner helped to draft a constitution for the renegade nation, along with the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG), the non-profit organization that put together the document. Hitchner specializes in Roman history, archaeology and international relations.
Now that Kosovo has declared its independence, the ratification of a constitution is the next step. I spoke with Hitchner about what the international implications could be and how this may influence U.S. nation building in Iraq.
Jamie Bologna: What role did you play in drafting the Kosovar constitution?
Bruce Hitchner: A couple of years ago I was involved in a process to shape the constitution for an independent Kosovo ... That draft is now part of the process that Kosovo will go through now that it has declared its independence; it is required under the Ahtisaari Plan to ratify a constitution over the next 120 days or so. They will probably be using that constitutional document as the basis for their constitution, because they are not yet a completely sovereign state. They've declared independence but they've agreed to have a quasi-independent status under the Ahtisaari plan [a proposal that was the foundation of the United Nations Security Council's resolution recommending Kosovo's independence]. [This] means the international community can come into Kosovo and set up an international mission that is run largely by the [European Union]. It will help the country develop its institutions and structures so that it is capable of becoming a fully fledged functional European state, ultimately in the European Union.
JB: And up until [Sunday] Kosovo was being run and administered by the United Nations?
BH: That ended [Sunday], yes. Effectively Kosovo is now an independent state following discussions at the U.N. that will not be overturned. Even if objections are brought by Serbia or Russia, they will almost certainly be vetoed in the Security Council by the United States or Britain. [Kosovo] has and will begin to work with the European Union closely so it can ratify a constitution and so it can become a member of the European Union in perhaps a dozen or so years from now.
JB: Why are places like China and Sri Lanka against Kosovo's declaration? Why is Russia calling the declaration illegal?
BH: The issue can be explained in a couple of ways. The concern of Russia has to do with the U.N. resolution 1299, which said the status of Kosovo would be decided in the future. 1299 was clearly written with the view that one option would be that Kosovo would return to Serbia or the decision could be made that it could have another status, where one of the options was independence. The reason why the Russians and some other states oppose it is because Kosovo is a province, technically, of Serbia. By sanctioning the breakaway of a province, some members of the international community are saying that it is a legitimate action for provinces to break away from sovereign states.
But Kosovo is a unique situation, one in which there was an international mandate to intervene because of the enormous oppression by the Serbian government - literally ethnic cleansing and potential expulsion of a whole population. So, in a sense, the argument for stopping Serbia from carrying out things like ethnic cleansing and other activities, which could verge on charges of crimes against humanity and genocide, was a legitimate cause for international intervention. The population of Kosovo, which is 90-percent Kosovar-Albanian, could actually have been expelled under Milosevic's Serbia, and attempts were being made to do so, and genocide was being carried out in some ways. So Kosovo created a unique situation in the relationships between sovereign states and the international community.
JB: Under the Ahtisaari plan, is the Serbian minority in Kosovo protected?
BH: The Serbian minority in Kosovo must be protected under the plan. There [are] quite a few mechanisms which will be built up and put into place to help ensure that that is the case. The new prime minister has made it very clear that the Kosovar-Albanians in Kosovo will respect the rights and responsibilities of the Serbs.
JB: But there is a possibility that violence could break out again?
BH: It's possible. I think it is unlikely because Serbia itself has made it clear that it does not intend to take steps that lead to violence, it will not pursue military action and all its options will be diplomatic and political. I expect nothing from Serbia in this regard. Apart from possible small-scale violence, I don't anticipate anything of a major nature occurring in Kosovo.
We cannot guarantee that violence could not or might not occur from time to time. I think it is unlikely that the international community would have put into place the Ahtisaari Plan that allowed the independence process to go forward if they thought there was a severe risk to the Serbs in Kosovo.
JB: Now that Kosovo has declared its independence and they have about 120 days to ratify a constitution, what do you think is next?
BH: I think it is going to take a little bit of time; I think it will take the full period. Now moving forward with the constitutional process, I don't see things like gridlock, since there's a very large, dominant population and a very small Serb population.
But it is not simply the signing of the constitution; it will be the necessity to implement the institution of the constitution, which means also implementing government structures, agencies, industries, etc. That process is already underway, but Kosovo does not have full-fledged functioning state institutions yet.
JB: What about the EU?
BH: It will be a long time before Kosovo gets into the European Union and before Russia and Serbia accept the reality of Kosovo's existence. It is going to be a state in between. That is a real challenge for the European Union, because the EU has embarked on a major policy of enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe and now the Balkans. If Kosovo remains underdeveloped and unable to become part of the European Union it will cast a shadow over the larger effort in the Western Balkans.
There is good reason to think that Russia has no interest in seeing nations in the Western Balkans become part of NATO or the EU, because they are trying to reassert their influence in the region after the end of the Cold War. It is very unlikely that Russia will be forthcoming. Right now Russia is doing very well economically; it is buying up companies in the region [and] energy resources. Russia is trying to use its economic power to translate it into political power.
So there is a possibility for extended uncertainty in the Western Balkans. There is real reason to think we're going to be watching this region with great concern for some years to come.
Jamie Bologna is a senior majoring in political science and Spanish. He can be reached at James.Bologna@tufts.edu.
