Just as many of my fellow Americans and I were being lulled into a sense of optimism by news of steady headway being made by our troops in southern Afghanistan and the determination of President Hamid Karzai's government to vanquish the Taliban and al-Qaida insurgents, I was jolted back into reality by the appearance of the Afghan president visibly shaken and crying on national TV halfway through a speech he was delivering on Sept. 28. Seeing such an open display of emotion by the president, a man who exudes an aura of confidence and charisma and whose imposing physique leaves a lasting impression, persuaded me to revisit the situation in the Afghanistan and explore several issues related to Karzai's apparently unscripted delivery. These include the precedent that the president has set to end the hostilities and stabilize a country that has not enjoyed real peace since the armies of Alexander the Great battled the Afghan tribesmen around 330 B.C.
Karzai's crying episode on the Afghan national television may take some time to be assessed, considering that many Afghans could still be scratching their heads and straining their brains to make sense of it all. However, I would be surprised if his public display of emotion produces favorable results in a society that derides men who cry openly, let alone a president who is expected to maintain his composure under any circumstances. What should really matter in this case is whether the Taliban perceive his appearance as the equivalent of "crying uncle" in our culture and also if his supporters inside and outside of Afghanistan perceived this as a letdown.
However, one should not jump to conclusions before learning the reason for his sudden outburst and whether what he did was justifiable, regardless of the ensuing political or social fallout. Earlier in the day, prior to Karzai's speech, a suicide attack killed the deputy governor of the Ghazni province, the governor's son and nephew and several bodyguards. This may explain why the president tearfully departed from his script to renew his appeal for reconciliation with the Taliban insurgents and decry the state of his homeland, although he was originally expected to deliver a speech to promote education.
The second issue I would like to discuss is related to the possible ways to achieve and maintain peace in this besieged country. Let me start by saying that the success of former President George W. Bush's surge in Iraq could be replicated in Afghanistan now that Gen. Petraeus has become the commander of the U.S. forces, providing that there is a change in strategy and approach. As we know, the Iraq surge had two main aspects: committing about 20,000 soldiers to help the Iraqi soldiers uproot the insurgents in Diyala, Anbar, Baghdad and other Iraqi provinces, which they accomplished; and forming alliances with the tribes in these areas, which led to the creation of "Majalis al-Sahwa" (awakening council groups) that helped turn the tide against the insurgents, including the al-Qaida jihadists. Even though President Barack Obama has committed about 30,000 additional troops, the establishment of alliances similar to those in Iraq appears to be out of reach for the time being, due to a couple of factors.
First, unlike the situation in Iraq, in which the insurgents were considered outsiders operating in areas dominated by tribes that initially remained neutral but were later persuaded to join the U.S. and Iraqi troops, the insurgency in Afghanistan is being launched by the Pashtun tribesmen who actually control the territory. The efforts on the part of Petraeus to persuade factions of the Pashtun and members of other tribes — including the Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek — to join the fight against the Taliban Pashtu, or Pashtun insurgency, led by Mullah Omar, have yet to make significant headway in the southern provinces of Afghanistan.
At this juncture, I would like to explain the connection between the Taliban and the Pashtun tribe so that we will be able to see the similarities and differences between the Iraqi and the Afghan situations. In America we always hear about the Taliban as the group we are fighting against, but we hardly ever hear about the Pashtun tribe. Some people are probably unaware that the name "Taliban" (a Pashto word that means "students") was coined as the nom de guerre for the insurgents who were mostly Pashtun and former students of Islamic law and theology.
The group later penetrated into Afghanistan through Pakistan and engaged in the destructive civil war that erupted after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union's troops from the country in 1989. This is how the Taliban ended up controlling nearly 90 percent of Afghanistan. When the United States was attacked on Sept. 11, U.S. forces joined hands with the Taliban rivals, known as the Northern Alliance and led by Hamid Karzai (who is a Pashtun), and consequently uprooted the Taliban insurgents, forcing them to withdraw to the mountainous regions in southern Afghanistan.
The second factor pertains to the creation of peace partners. Although the surge in Afghanistan is similar to the surge in Iraq in terms of escalating our involvement in the war by committing more troops on the ground, it takes different political maneuvering to transform antagonists into peace partners. At this point, the U.S. government and its NATO Allies, as well as the Karzai government and the Pakistani government led by President Asif Ali Zardari, are pursuing a policy of relentless military pressure and intermittent diplomatic persuasion — or as we call it, a policy of "the carrot and the stick" to force the Taliban to lay down their arms. In order to make an alternative to conflict seem like the right choice, in his televised appearance Karzai not only invited the Taliban to negotiate with the government, but he also left the door open to the possibility of a partnership in a coalition government. Prior to his televised appeal, Karzai had formed a council of 70 Afghan nationals whose main task was to negotiate a truce with their foes and convince them that once they forswear violence they would be invited to join the political process. I believe that the other condition that the Taliban need to meet is the eviction of al-Qaida terrorists from their midst, for this group has brought nothing but conflict, misery and isolation to Afghanistan.
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Fathi El-Shibibi is an adjunct lecturer of Islam and Arabic culture at Northeastern University.
