Towards its end, the historic and chaotic 2000 election seemed to be spiraling out of control. The two candidates, who only weeks earlier crisscrossed the nation smiling for cameras and begging for votes, became reclusive. While Bush found himself locked in his Crawford ranch like a child in his room, Gore slowly joined Humphrey, Dukakis, and Mondale as Democratic losers, a club in which membership is hardly desirable.
Meanwhile, the contested state of Florida was teeming with extremists, both Democrats and Republicans, shouting political obscenities and displaying signs with questionable and illegible syntax. Once obscure individuals were vaulted into the media spotlight, and the nation found a woman whose appearance practically made Linda Tripp appear attractive - Secretary of State Katherine Harris.
And thus, an election that began as a yawn became an unappealing yet exciting wrestling match, causing the aged James Baker and the sedated Warren Christopher to come out of retirement for one last battle. And who can forget the plight of the elderly Floridians, whose worries quickly shifted from deciding whether to order the chicken or the fish to whether they voted for Al Gore or that ragamuffin Rutherford B. Hayes. Let's all be thankful that the passive and unbiased Supreme Court rendered a palatable decision based on principles, not politics, snuffing out the spark that nearly set America ablaze.
Yet only one person could have saved us from this electoral debacle: Al Gore, the man who lost by getting nearly 500,000 more votes than his opponent. With Herculean heroism, Gore could have easily "got the Bushes out." A strong economy, widespread approval of the previous administration, and a general aura of complacency hovered around the nation, yet Gore was never able to attach himself with the beating heart of the body electorate. Conventional wisdom suggests that he should have finished this election by riding through America on the golden chariot of victory. Instead, the chariot was commandeered by the successful Bush campaign, leaving Gore to choke on the cloud of dirt kicked up by the laughing and cocky "W."
Where the Gore campaign faltered and floundered will be analyzed and written about for years to come. Though some Democrats may argue vehemently to the contrary, Gore did not lose because the Republicans stopped the Florida recount. In fact, this seems to be one of the largest delusions of the 2000 election. Sure, Gore would have won if the nearly 14,000 elderly voters in Palm Beach had worn their bifocals on Election Day. But stating this is just like saying Gore would have won had his former boss not "had sexual relations with that woman."
Certain variables are wholly impossible to predict and unable to be explained and thus are not sufficient explanations for why Gore lost. Rather, Gore's inability to defeat Bush comes down to the former vice president's campaign decisions and strategies. Gore's weaknesses, rather than Bush's strengths, tilted this election in Bush's favor.
In both '92 and '96, the first thing Clinton did as a candidate was ensure that his support base was not only mobilized but also inspired. In fact, one of his greatest assets was transforming all sectors of the Democratic Party into staunch Clintonites. This was a weak area for Gore. Though he was raised amidst politics, Gore lacks the natural political abilities that enhanced Clinton's campaigns. For Gore, it took longer to secure the votes of certain factions within the Democratic Party. He failed to inspire the left as Clinton had done. Even in the waning days of the campaign, many Democratic supporters were scrambling to mobilize African-American and urban voters.
True, Gore gained the largest percentage of African-American voters of any candidate, but it took him the entire campaign to secure their support. And early in the primaries, there was some question of whether labor would strongly support Gore. Labor - usually one of the strongest supporters of the Democratic Party - was weary of Gore's stance on trade. Gore had to work hard to ensure that labor would be on his side. Even when labor threw its weight behind him, Gore never had the same support that Clinton once enjoyed. Thus, Gore had to work in both the early and later days of the campaign to ensure that he could win traditional Democratic strongholds like Michigan, Illinois, and Minnesota. Because he failed to lock up these states early in the campaign, Gore had to make up for lost time late in the campaign when he should have been focused solely on voters in the ideological center. By the end, he was attempting to appease both the left and the center, a feat which would have been impossible even for the most seasoned candidate.
This leads to the question of Ralph Nader, whose candidacy represents Gore's failure to secure the votes of the typically loyal left wing of his party. Early in the general election campaign, Gore seemed to ignore the effect Nader might have on the election. Nader didn't cost Gore the election, for if Gore had appeased the left wing of his party early on, he would not have lost these votes. What Bush did is the opposite of what Gore did. Early on, during the primaries and during the general election campaign, Bush ensured that he would have the votes of the Republican right by advocating traditional conservative ideas. Gore was afraid to appease the left for fear he might alienate the center; Bush showed that a candidate could simultaneously appease both. The difference here was that Bush had the extreme wing of his party securely in his favor, whereas Gore did not. On the Democratic side, it wasn't that Nader was a popular candidate, but rather that Gore failed to mobilize that segment of his party.
Gore's geographic strategy can also be questioned. The first flaw was that he didn't spend any time in the South, save for Florida. The ever-changing Southern political landscape is undergoing yet another transition, one that Gore could have successfully exploited. Georgia has one of the largest populations of African Americans in the US. Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Louisiana all have either a Democratic governor, or legislator, or senator, or some combination therein. Clearly Gore could have influenced the races in these states through focused campaigning. Plus, being a man from the South, Gore could have effectively campaigned in at least some of these regions.
Also in the South, Gore should have let Clinton loose in Arkansas, among other areas. Clinton would have been a great asset, but Gore's calculated and methodological campaign decided against it, possibly costing him the election. The so-called "Clinton factor" was more a myth than a reality. Failing to see this, Gore did not use the greatest politician/campaigner of the 20th century. Seems like a bad mistake.
Another geographic error was spending so much money and time in California towards the end of the campaign. Credit Bush with this misstep, for he created the aura that California was still in play even though Bush never had a chance. The then-Texas governor successfully diverted Gore's attention from such critical states as Missouri and Florida by creating the California mirage. In such a close race, this seems to have made a significant difference.
Gore's campaign was also too calculated, deliberate, and pandering. He failed to come off as natural, especially in his debate debacles. Though the majority of America agreed with Gore on the issues, he failed to present these issues in a smooth, natural manner. His rigid mannerisms were unappealing, and his vacillating personality turned voters off. Gore lacked the ability to appear natural on TV. In this and other ways, he was the anti-Clinton. If he had campaigned in the manner in which he gave his final speech, the one in which he conceded the race, Gore would have won this election hands down. Instead, he gave the nation about eight different personalities; he was the schizophrenic candidate.
The 2000 election was Gore's election to lose, and he did so, handing the nation over to George W. Bush. Hopefully he learned from his mistakes, and can return in 2004 enlightened, energized, and ready to steal back what was rightfully his: the presidency.
Adam Blickstein is a freshman who has not yet declared a major. He is the communications director of the Tufts Democrats.
