Since U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton selected Stephen Bosworth, the dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, to oversee Washington's North Korea policy, on Feb. 20, the Korean peninsula has seen a flurry of diplomatic activity and escalating rhetoric.
North Korea has announced that it intends to launch a communications satellite between April 4 and 8. A number of foreign governments have voiced concerns that the launch is a cover for a test of ballistic missile technology. South Korea and the United States recently participated in an annual joint military exercise that the North labeled as preparations for an attack.
North Korea decided last week it would no longer accept food aid from the United States and asked foreign aid groups to leave its soil. Meanwhile, six-party talks on denuclearization have been stalled since December, after a dispute between the North and the United States over a process to verify the reclusive Communist nation's nuclear activity.
Earlier this month, Bosworth visited China, South Korea and Japan for discussions on restarting the six-party talks, which include Russia, China, Japan, the United States and the two Koreas. He traveled to Pyongyang last month on a private visit before his State Department appointment.
The Daily sat down yesterday for an interview with Bosworth. The following is partial transcript. Log onto www.TuftsDaily.com for the full audio version.
Ben Gittleson: I was wondering what your take on the recent expulsion of aid workers from North Korea was and what the effect of that was.
Stephen Bosworth: I don't really know why the North Koreans decided to do that. They haven't really given an explanation. It's somewhat surprising, because we know they need the food that the workers were providing or were delivering. Whether this is a permanent position or whether it's a temporary move, we don't know.
BG: In a more general sense, do you think that North Korea is engaging in behavior that signifies its preference for starting with a clean slate with the Obama administration, in terms of the expulsion of the aid workers, its suspected upcoming missile test and generally increasing bellicose rhetoric?
SB: I don't think we know, and in my experience it's always a mistake to guess why North Korea is doing something. Basically we have to accept what they're doing is what they're doing and move on from that.
BG: Do you think that they're testing President [Barack] Obama?
SB: I don't know. I think they think probably that they're putting themselves in a better negotiating position. I would argue that that's not the case, but I'm obviously not making their decisions.
BG: This is not the first time that this has happened — that they've had increasingly aggressive rhetoric and actions, have exercised a policy of putting maximum pressure on the U.S., on South Korea, and others — even though you've said you can't guess as to why they're doing it … Was this flurry of activity predicted in Washington?
SB: I don't think anyone's terribly surprised, but it's really not all that crucial to know why they're doing it. We just know they're doing it and you have to react to it.
BG: How do you react to it?
SB: We stay calm, measured, and communicate our continued our willingness to engage.
BG: Is there a limit to staying calm and measured?
SB: What's our alternative?
BG: Some have said that there's a need for diplomatic engagement on a higher level with North Korea, such as at the secretary level. I was wondering what your thoughts were on that and on the creation of the new position that you hold.
SB: We're prepared to engage at whatever level seems appropriate. Obviously, you don't start at the top and work down. You start at the level you can, and when you've accomplished some things and made some progress, you may want to move to a higher level — I don't know.
BG: Regarding North Korea's announcement that it's going to launch a satellite, possibly between April 4 and the 8th, do you believe that it's a cover for ballistic missile … technology testing?
SB: We'll wait and see, but it uses basically the same launch gear. Whether they're trying to launch a satellite or testing a ballistic missile, it has the same ultimate purpose.
BG: Whatever they're doing, it'll still be a violation of international law?
SB: That's the finding of our lawyers and the lawyers of other countries. It's a violation of [United Nations] Security Council Resolution 1718.
BG: Will the United States' response be the same whether they launch a satellite?
SB: I don't want to get into the question of what the U.S. response might be.
BG: You've … sent stark warnings to [North Korea], saying [a launch] would be "ill-advised." What impact do you think your warnings will have on North Korea's decision? … You've been meeting with North Korean officials, you command a lot of respect in the region.
SB: We'll just have to wait and see if they pay attention or not … To answer that question would be speculative at this point. I'm not prepared to speculate.
BG: What implications would a launch have on any possible resumption of the six-party talks?
SB: Well, I don't think it would change our ultimate objective, which is denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. That's what the six-party talks are aimed at. But how we fit that together with what they may or may not do with regard to a missile launch remains to be seen.
BG: So, potentially, the six-party talks could start up again soon, regardless of the North's actions at the beginning of the next month?
SB: Again, we'll have to wait and see. I'm not being very fulsome in my answers, but these are all issues that are under consideration now in our capital and in other capitals. But, as I said, our ultimate objective remains very firmly the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, so we don't want to sacrifice that.
BG: Because the Obama administration is dealing with such a diverse slate of … pressing foreign policy issues and Secretary Clinton's appointed a number of special envoys, what sort of priority do you believe the Obama administration should give to the North Korean issue?
SB: I think it's demonstrated it wants to give it very high priority. This is an issue of great importance to the United States and our allies and friends in the region and our global non-proliferation goals.
BG: Have formal goals been set for your position then?
SB: No, formal goals haven't been set, other than what I've been talking about here.
BG: Can you clarify a little bit about the division of work between your position and [State Department official] Sun Kim's position?
SB: We're working together. He is going to be the U.S. envoy to the six-party talks who will represent the U.S. on a day-to-day basis. I will be involved within the region and directly with North Korea, and I will be available for work bilaterally with our partners. Sun Kim basically works for me.
BG: In terms of your main tasks … also there [are] human rights issues. Can you elaborate a bit more about this?
SB: We are now looking at possible people to be selected as special envoys for human rights in North Korea.
BG: Because you keep saying, ‘We'll wait and see' … and you can't really speculate with North Korea, can you elaborate a little bit on [how] your work with the North Koreans and in the region has led you to take that view so stringently?
SB: It's just that until decisions are finally made and we actually have the specifics of a policy, it's not really appropriate for me to comment on what that policy might or might not be.
BG: More [on the] developments over the weekend … What efforts are the State Department making to free the two American journalists [that the North confirmed on Sunday that it was holding]?
SB: The State Department has made representations to the government of North Korea, which is investigating what happened, but that's not primarily under my responsibility. The State Department does this sort of service for American citizens around the world.
BG: Is it too early to tell how the detainment would affect your work?
SB: Well, hopefully it will not affect it, but it's really too early to know.
BG: Speaking from a Tufts perspective, I was wondering how you're planning on splitting your time between the Fletcher School and your job in Washington.
SB: First of all, I think you expand the whole. You know, I was working hard just here, but obviously taking on this new responsibility means that my workday is going to extend and grow. I will be in Washington a day or two every couple of weeks, and I'll probably be traveling out in the region there for a week or so every month or two months. I'm very pleased and grateful that the university has been so supportive of my doing this.
BG: How will it affect your work at the Fletcher School in terms of interacting with faculty and students?
SB: I don't think it will affect it negatively in the least. In fact, I'm now planning to have a series of sessions with students to talk to them about the experience of dealing with North Korea. I'd think they'd find that very relevant to their educational experience.
BG: Is that series of discussions going to be open to the entire university or is it just Fletcher?
SB: Well, at the moment, it's just Fletcher, but I'm talking with the provost's office about doing something university-wide that [School of] Arts and Sciences students in particular could participate in.
BG: So are these conversations going to be more along the lines of you … explaining your work and they can ask you questions, or are you going to be looking for input from students?
SB: I'm always looking for input. If people have good ideas, this is a problem that demands more ideas, but it's going to be primarily talking about the process and practice of doing something like this. Obviously, there are some limitations on discussion of confidential material that I'm going to have to observe, but a lot of what we're going to be doing can be shared, and I think it is of interest to students in general.
BG: [Regarding your decision to accept your appointment to overseeing North Korea policy, how was that decision process made in your mind — reentering public service?
SB: For me, it was something that I thought would be interesting and useful to do, but I specifically did not want to do anything on a full-time basis because I did not want to leave Fletcher and Tufts.
BG: Did you ever see yourself reentering public service like this?
SB: I've learned never to say never. I would not have been able to predict this, but suffice it to say, I'm pleased to be able to do it.
BG: Do you think that the Obama administration will take a very different approach to North Korea in terms of how it fits into its foreign policy goals in general? … Or do you think … the way the United States deals with North Korea will stay unchanged?
SB: I think that, in general, the Obama administration's foreign policy is framed by the principles of engagement, negotiation and diplomacy, always bearing in mind that diplomacy, to be successful, at times may need an element of strength. In other words, diplomacy is not for wussies. Diplomacy is a very effective way of dealing with other countries, particularly in dealing with the threats that occasionally emerge from other countries. But I think there is a predisposition toward engagement and dialogue, and that characterizes — will characterize — our attitude toward North Korea.
BG: Do you think that this predisposition is different from in the past?
SB: It's not as different from the last couple of years as it is from the six years that preceded that. There will be changes, I'm sure, over time, as we adjust to changing circumstances.
