From the obnoxious frat-boy shrieks overheard at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy on the night of May 1 to the outpouring of patriotism that swept many parts of the United States over the days that followed, it is clear that the death of al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden is a defining moment in American history. Less clear and more contentious, however, is what exactly this means for the future of the U.S.-led fight against terrorism and al-Qaida as an organization.
Some claim the death of the world's most recognizable Islamist terrorist may be the final nail in the coffin of a fading al-Qaida, while others dismiss it as an insignificant triumph in a broader sense, given the decentralized nature of the organization. As is often the case, both sides are partly correct. For while bin Laden's death further cripples a wounded al-Qaida by removing a key source of its ideological appeal, it does little to assuage the central U.S. dilemmas in winning the war on terror.
Bin Laden's death is unquestionably a devastating loss for al-Qaida. Much of the organization's appeal was tied to his story as a man who gave up power and wealth in Saudi Arabia to build and manage a network committed to waging violent jihad against the crusader West and establishing an Islamic caliphate. Bin Laden's beaming charisma and compelling narrative as al-Qaida's ideological leader swelled al-Qaida's ranks in a way that his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri will find difficult to replicate.
This news also comes at a particularly bad time for al-Qaida. Over the past few years, its numbers have dwindled, cash has dried up and its major operations and communications have been intercepted. Mounting CIA-controlled Predator drone missile strikes in North Waziristan have killed many senior figures and operatives. The organization's influence has also waned in many Muslim countries, including in Palestine, where only a third of respondents now say they have confidence that bin Laden is "doing the right thing in world affairs," compared to over 70 percent in 2003. The "Arab Spring" has also undermined the very rationale of al-Qaida because countries like Egypt and Tunisia have illustrated that authoritarian regimes can be overthrown through democratic, peaceful revolutions rather than violence and terrorism. And even within al-Qaida, there is talk of divisions over its future direction that could widen after Mr. Zawahiri takes the helm.
Despite this, the impact of bin Laden's death is limited by his organization's structure. Over the past few years, al-Qaida has evolved from a more hierarchical organization into a devolved set of networks, with an al-Qaida "core" in Afghanistan and Pakistan only exercising control over strategy and ideology, while offshoots in countries like Somalia and Yemen are executing direct operations. Of particular concern is al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, which, under the leadership of Nasser al-Wahayshi, a close associate of bin Laden, and Anwar al-Awlaki, a charismatic American-Yemeni cleric, has inspired incidents like the Fort Hood shootings and the attempted Christmas underpants bombing. Meanwhile, in Pakistan, an entrenched jihadist subculture supported by elements of the army and intelligence agencies continues to move domestic groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba closer to al-Qaida, as was seen in the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
Looking ahead, bin Laden's death also does little to change the fundamental dilemmas that U.S. policymakers will have to grapple with. True, more intelligence seized from bin Laden's compound may increase the wherewithal of American law enforcement agencies to foil potential terrorist plots in the near future. And this case does demonstrate the utility of limited, targeted U.S. operations to disrupt terrorist networks in countries where al-Qaida still thrives.
But after spending 15 years in pursuit of bin Laden, years that involved two quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan, over $1 trillion and the loss of at least 150,000 lives, the basic realities of the war on terrorism remain unchanged. In Afghanistan, U.S. President Barack Obama is likely to face even more pressure to withdraw troops now that bin Laden has been killed, despite the fact that the Afghan security forces and government still do not have the capacity to fend off the Taliban without foreign assistance. Pakistan's tacit support for militant groups is likely to continue unless it realizes this creates Frankenstein monsters it cannot control and starts taking responsibility for its own actions rather than just blaming outsiders. And al-Qaida's ideology will continue to breed in countries where political oxygen allows it to do so, like in Yemen where a fledgling government faces multiple emergencies including rebellion in the north, secession in the south and rapidly depleting resources like oil and water.
There are things the United States can continue do at the margins, like showering states with billions of dollars in economic and military assistance to help fight terrorism, using drones and other targeted strikes, cheering on indigenous democratic movements in the Arab world and improving its own image in the region. But beyond this, nations must realize themselves that terrorism is a threat that needs to be eradicated, develop the necessary capacities and take significant steps toward doing so. As every counterinsurgency manual tritely advises, the sustainable way to wage an effective war against terrorism is not to destroy the enemy but to provide lasting security to the local population to win it over.
Not even the death of one of the world's deadliest terrorists changes this age-old prescription, no matter how loud the frat boy celebrations may have been that May night.
